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The year 2015 marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the first DNA exoneration in the 
United States. In the last twenty-five years, the Innocence Movement has succeeded in achieving 
thousands of additional exonerations while bringing about significant reform in the criminal 
justice system. These reforms have sought to address the primary causes of wrongful convictions, 
including eyewitness misidentification, false confessions, and flawed forensic science. However, 
while pre-trial and investigatory policy changes have begun to take hold, very few comparable 
systemic procedural reforms have been implemented in the post-conviction context. In fact, in 
1996, on the eve of the Innocent Movement, Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act [“AEDPA”]. Rather than seeking to alter post-conviction procedure to more 
effectively address viable claims of innocence, AEDPA operated to radically restrict federal 
habeas review for state prisoners. Nowhere is AEDPA’s impact more devastating than in the 
context of factually innocence prisoners seeking review of their wrongful convictions. 
Under AEDPA’s provisions, prisoners are subject to an unyielding one-year filing period 
widely regarded as unreasonable, and the standard for establishing innocence is onerous to the 
point of being virtually insurmountable. Indeed, of the first 250 DNA exonerations stemming 
from the Innocence Movement, not a single prisoner succeeded in raising a post-conviction claim 
of innocence via federal habeas corpus.
2
 Although federal habeas corpus review was historically 
designed to perform the fundamental function of correcting wrongful convictions of the innocent, 
under AEDPA, federal habeas review no longer adequately achieves that goal. 
Notably, the overhaul of federal habeas procedure under AEDPA occurred before the 
Innocence Movement was in full swing. Thus, the debate leading up to the enactment of AEDPA 
did not benefit from the exoneration data available today. Now that the number of exonerations 
                                                                
1  Tim Bakken, Models of Justice to Protect Innocent Persons, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 837, 841 
(2011/2012) (quoting Margaret Raymond, The Problem with Innocence, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449, 463 (2001)). 
2  BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 185 
(2011) (noting that not a single DNA exoneration in the study was successful in raising a post-conviction claim based on 
new evidence of actual innocence). 
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has risen to over 1,700
3
—a figure widely recognized as the mere tip of the iceberg—the moment 
to revisit federal review of criminal convictions is long overdue.
4
 This Article proposes a federal 
post-conviction innocence track as a viable, systemic response to the wrongful conviction crisis. 
As the Innocence Movement turns twenty-five—and as it continues to expose the depths of the 
wrongful conviction crisis in the American criminal justice system—the time has come for more 
widespread systemic reform. 
The post-conviction innocence track proposal presented in this Article revives a 
comparable recommendation made by prominent habeas scholars Joseph C. Hoffmann and 
William J. Stuntz, over twenty-five years ago. In 1993, prior to the passage of AEDPA, Professors 
Hoffmann and Stuntz proposed a separate procedural track for prisoners raising claims of actual 
innocence via federal habeas corpus.
5
 This idea did not gain traction in the decades after it was 
proposed; to the contrary, the passage of AEDPA just three years later had precisely the opposite 
impact, imposing additional procedural barriers on prisoners raising post-conviction claims of 
innocence.
6
 Yet the rationale behind the Hoffmann and Stuntz proposal applies with even greater 
force today, now that the Innocence Movement has exposed the depths of the wrongful conviction 
crisis. 
A federal post-conviction innocence track is attractive because it offers a universal 
avenue of relief for all state and federal prisoners, regardless of the jurisdiction of the underlying 
conviction. This approach offers a venue where the assessment of innocence claims could offer 
meaningful protection for all prisoners. Further, at the post-conviction stage, participation in an 
innocence track would not require a waiver of constitutional rights. Finally, this approach would 
align with the purpose of federal habeas corpus review—to remedy wrongful convictions of the 
innocent.
7
 Given the limited judicial resources available for reviewing and litigating federal 
habeas corpus petitions, it is wise to devote the lion’s share to the most deserving applicants. 
Part I of this Article discusses the evolution of federal habeas corpus review since the 
passage of AEDPA in 1996. Part II examines the impact of the Innocence Movement on the 
operation of federal post-conviction review. Part III critiques previous proposals to establish a 
                                                                
3  See National Registry of Exonerations, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/mission.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2015) (listing 1,702 known exonerations in the United States as of Nov. 17, 2015). 
4  John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 297 (2006) (arguing that 
“[g]iven the number of exonerations in recent years, the scope of the writ—if it is to retain its historical function as a 
safeguard of freedom in our criminal justice system—should be expanded, not contracted . . . ”). 
5  Joseph C. Hoffmann & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 65, 95 (1993) 
(proposing a “reasonable probability of innocence” standard in federal habeas corpus procedure). 
6  See, e.g., Lyn Entzeroth, Struggling for Federal Judicial Review of Successive Claims of Innocence: A 
Study of How Federal Courts Wrestled with the AEDPA to Provide Individuals Convicted of Non-Existent Crimes with 
Habeas Corpus Review, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 75, 87 (2005) (“[T]he AEDPA . . . created significant restrictions on a 
federal prisoner’s ability to actually move a federal court for . . . relief.”); Kenneth Williams, The Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act: What’s Wrong With It and How to Fix It, 33 CONN. L. REV. 919, 919-20 (2001) (asserting 
that AEDPA has made it “more difficult for claims of innocence to be heard by federal courts”); Amy Knight Burns, 
Counterfactual Contradictions: Interpretive Error in the Analysis of AEDPA, 65 STAN. L. REV. 203, 228 (2013) (“Habeas 
is not an exercise in protecting states’ autonomy at all costs. Indeed, if that were the goal, there would be no habeas review 
at all. Instead, courts must balance federalism interests with defendants’ constitutional rights.”). 
7  Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 85 (noting that “nowhere is the remedial role of habeas so important 
as in the case of a . . . [wrongfully convicted] innocent person”). 
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pre-trial innocence track. Part IV discusses the historical support for a federal post-conviction 
innocence track, including the Hoffmann and Stuntz proposal from 1993. Finally, Part V 
advocates for a federal post-conviction innocence track, and suggests a conceptual framework for 
this proposal. 
I. EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW SINCE AEDPA 
The purpose of the writ of federal habeas corpus, or “the Great Writ” has historically 
been to provide a remedy for wrongful convictions.
8
 Indeed, the “protection of innocent 
defendants” is widely recognized as the primary concern in the context of federal habeas review 
of criminal convictions.
9
 While AEDPA ostensibly sought to balance that historical purpose with 
the countervailing interests of federalism, comity and finality, many conclude that Congress failed 
to achieve this balance.
10
 
In fact, AEDPA is a statute that likely never would have passed without the fortuitous 
exploitation of the Oklahoma City bombings and the prosecution of Timothy McVeigh.
11
 As one 
legal scholar has noted, “AEDPA’s antiterrorism and habeas provisions were a legislative pairing 
occasioned by a national tragedy . . . [that] few legislators dared oppose.”
12
 
A. The Passage of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act [“AEDPA”] 
In spite of AEDPA’s name, the undisputed impact of the legislation was to overhaul 
federal habeas corpus review for all prisoners—not merely those charged with terrorism or death 
penalty offenses.
13
 AEDPA was enacted to vindicate the principles of “comity, finality and 
federalism”, all of which militate against relief for the petitioner regardless of the nature of the 
claim.
14
 The authors of AEDPA sought to address the rampant “abuse of the writ,” the notion that 




                                                                
8  See, e.g., Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 69 (“The statutory writ of federal habeas corpus for state 
prisoners can be categorized as one example of the general class of federal court remedies that have been created or 
recognized for the purpose of redressing violations of federal constitutional rights.”). 
9  Id. at 85 (discussing the notion of “the primacy of innocence” in federal habeas corpus jurisprudence). 
10  See, e.g., Entzeroth, supra note 6, at 87 (arguing that AEDPA imposed undue restrictions on federal 
habeas procedure); Williams, supra note 6, at 919-20 (asserting that AEDPA has made it “more difficult for claims of 
innocence to be heard by federal courts”). 
11  Blume, supra note 4, at 265-70 (discussing political climate during the debate and enactment of 
AEDPA). 
12  Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV. 443, 447 (2007) 
(discussing political climate at time of AEDPA’s passage). 
13  Judith L. Ritter, The Voice of Reason—Why Recent Judicial Interpretations of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act’s Restrictions on Habeas Corpus are Wrong, 37 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 55, 58-59 (2013) (noting 
provisions that “struck. . . deeply at the heart of the spirit and history of habeas corpus. . .”).  
14  See Kovarsky, supra note 12, at 444-45 (discussing the motivating principles behind the passage of 
AEDPA). 
15  See generally Stephanie Roberts Hartung, Missing the Forest for the Trees: Federal Habeas Corpus and 
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AEDPA passed in 1996, in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombings, after “decades of 
failed legislative attempts to. . .limit federal review”
16
 of state convictions. The measure passed in 
remarkably short order, with little legislative discussion or debate as to the post-conviction review 
procedures.
17
 However, some members of Congress argued that habeas corpus reform measures 
did not belong in an anti-terrorism bill.
18
 As Congress debated the merits of the new statutory 
scheme, there was a robust discussion of the provisions relating to terrorism, wiretapping and 
immigration.
19
 Yet very little comparable discussion or debate occurred regarding the overhauled 
post-conviction review procedures.
20
 Further, in signing the bill, President Clinton did little more 
than pay “lip service” to the provisions relating to federal review of state court convictions.
21
 
However, while the underlying purpose of AEDPA’s federal habeas review procedures 
clearly was to promote efficiency and finality of criminal convictions, the proponents of the 
legislation argued that federal habeas review would remain “alive and meaningful.”
22
 In fact, 
nothing in the express language of AEDPA suggests a purpose at odds with the history and 
purpose of the Great Writ, i.e., to redress injustices and provide a defense against violations of 
personal freedom.
23
 Instead, AEDPA’s proponents sought to respond to prosecutors who 
complained that federal courts “too often undid hard-won convictions or death sentences” via 
federal habeas corpus review.
24
 
At its core, the argument in support of AEDPA centered on the notion that federal review 
of state court convictions amounts to undue interference, given that crime prevention, prosecution 
and punishment fall squarely within the purview of state power.
25
 On the other hand, AEDPA 
                                                                
the Piecemeal Problem in Actual Innocence Cases, 10 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 55, 64-69 (2014) (providing a more complete 
discussion of the history of AEDPA’s passage). 
16  Justin Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather than the Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 93 
(2012); See also Larry Yackle, State Convicts and Federal Courts: Reopening the Habeas Corpus Debate, 91 CORNELL L. 
REV. 541, 545-46 (2006) (discussing history of AEDPA’s passage and commenting that “It was clear that some 
‘antiterrorism’ bill was going to pass and that anything wedged in to that bill would pass with it.”). 
17  Yackle, supra note 16, at 546 (noting that AEDPA was drafted by staff attorneys serving the Senate 
Judiciary Committee without the benefit of discussions with minority counsel or others over policy or wording, and no 
committee hearings or markup sessions, and concluding that the “bill shot through committee . . . and went to the floor 
without an explanatory report”). 
18  Ritter, supra note 13, at 58 n.27 (discussing legislative debate leading up to the passage of AEDPA).  
19  Id. at 73-74 (discussing history and purpose of AEDPA). 
20  Id. at 73-74, 82 (discussing history and purpose of AEDPA, and noting that the legislative history of 
AEDPA does not suggest that Congress intended any “watering down” of the Great Writ’s historical function).  
21   See Blume, supra note 4, at 259 (noting that while Clinton’s “presidential signing statement paid lip 
service to meaningful federal court review of state court convictions,” AEDPA’s focus was clearly the anti-terrorism and 
death penalty procedure reform measures). 
22  Ritter, supra note 13, at 82 (arguing that “nothing in AEDPA or its legislative history suggests intent to 
diminish the protective promise of the Great Writ”). 
23  Id. at 73-74, 82. 
24  Id. at 75. 
25  Blume, supra note 4, at 263-64 (noting that habeas opponents point to crime punishment and control as a 
“quintessential state function”). 
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opponents argued that federal habeas review of state convictions is necessary to preserve the 
sanctity and uniformity of federal law.
26
 Ultimately, AEDPA’s supporters won the day and 
AEDPA became law. 
B.  Criticisms of AEDPA 
Since its passage in 1996, AEDPA has been widely critiqued both in legal scholarship 
and in the media generally.
27
 For example, AEDPA has been criticized as a “poorly drafted” piece 
of legislation that was hastily enacted with little insight into Congress’ true intent.
28
 This poor 
drafting has led to ambiguity resulting in circuit splits on various issues.
29
 Additionally, courts 
have been left to interpret AEDPA’s often confusing and self-contradictory provisions, with little 
guidance. In short, legal scholars have argued that AEDPA has operated to catapult the federal 
habeas system into a state of chaos.
30
 
Further, the substantive impact of AEDPA on federal habeas review of state convictions 
cannot be overstated. Legal scholars have frequently commented on AEDPA’s role in gutting 
federal habeas review, and indeed, the substantive and procedural barriers imposed by AEDPA 
have been characterized as “insurmountable.”
31
 Some of AEDPA’s provisions have been targets 
for particularized critique as well, including the strict one-year filing limitation.
32
 
Widespread critique of AEDPA’s other provisions has been forthcoming as well, 
                                                                
26  Id. (“Proponents of broad habeas review extolled (and extol) the need for every inmate that so desires to 
have a federal forum to entertain the merits of her federal constitutional challenges to the underlying conviction and 
sentence.”). 
27  See Marceau, supra note 16, at 94 (noting that AEDPA’s passage was greeted by the legal academy with 
“vast fear and loathing”); see also Nat Hentoff, Clinton Screws the Bill of Rights: The Worst Civil Liberties President 
Since Nixon, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 5, 1996, at 12 (arguing that AEDPA contains “the most draconian restrictions on 
habeas corpus since Lincoln suspended the Great Writ. . . during the Civil War.”). 
28  See, e.g., Blume, supra note 4, at 261 (arguing that “the speed with which Congress enacted AEDPA left 
the Supreme Court, and lower federal courts, with little guidance regarding Congress’ intent”); Burns, supra note 6, at 
206-07 (noting that “AEDPA is a complex, poorly drafted statute that is impossible to interpret logically and consistently” 
and that “its text. . . is irresolvably ambiguous”); Kovarsky, supra note 12, at 447 (commenting that “AEDPA imposed or 
fortified several obstacles to habeas relief, although hastily ratified and poorly cohered.”); Yackle, supra note 16, at 548 
(“The manner in which AEDPA was cobbled together suggests that no one  
thought . . . [the impact of the statute’s provisions] through at a conceptual level.”). 
29  Blume, supra note 4, at 290 (discussing role of the Supreme Court in resolving circuit splits stemming 
from unclear drafting in various AEDPA provisions). 
30  Yackle, supra note 16, at 542 (arguing that the passage of AEDPA has left the state of federal habeas 
review procedures “in chaos”).  
31  See, e.g., Marceau, supra note 16, at 166 (commenting that “AEDPA poses procedural and substantive 
barriers that are often insurmountable”). 
32  See, e.g., Blume, supra note 4, at 289 (“[AEDPA’s] new statute of limitations has deprived thousands of 
potential habeas petitioners of any federal review of their convictions, and in some cases, their death sentences.”); see also 
Limin Zheng, Actual Innocence as a Gateway Through the Statute-of-Limitations Bar on the Filing of Federal Habeas 
Corpus Petitions, 90 CAL. L. REV. 2101, 2103-07 (2002) (discussing AEDPA’s statute of limitations provision as a radical 
departure from historical federal habeas jurisprudence).  
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particularly for the impact on actually innocent prisoners seeking review of their convictions.
33
 
For example, the wrongful conviction scholarship has criticized AEDPA’s bars on substantive 
relief, including restrictions on second and successive petitions.
34
 Additionally, several of 
AEDPA’s provisions have effectively abolished federal de novo review of state criminal 
convictions, in favor of a high degree of deference to state court decisions.
35
 At least one legal 
scholar has argued, “AEDPA has stripped substantive federal habeas review to the bone.”
36
 
Further, the substantive standards a prisoner is required to meet under AEDPA have been 
characterized as “very nearly impossible to satisfy.”
37
 Each of these criticisms is discussed in 
more detail below. 
1.  Statute of Limitations 
One of the primary criticisms of AEDPA focuses on its strict one-year limitations period.  
AEDPA’s passage demonstrated a marked departure from well-established common law, by 
imposing for the first time a one-year statute of limitations for filing federal habeas petitions.
38
 
Section 2244(d)(1) provides that a “1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a 
writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”
39
 This 
section of the statute further specifies that the limitations period begins to run on the date of final 
judgment or relevant change in the law, whichever is later, and tolls with the interim filing of a 
state habeas petition.
40
 While the statute does not expressly allow an exception for actual 
innocence, the Supreme Court has recognized that a cognizable claim of factual innocence could 
overcome procedural bars—at least in theory.
41
 
                                                                
33  Throughout this Article, the terms “factually innocent” and “actually innocent” are used interchangeably 
to refer to cases in which the charged party either did not commit the crimes in question, or no crime was committed at all.  
This category does not include the scenario in which a conviction was obtained in violation of the Constitution, i.e., based 
on illegally obtained evidence or ineffective assistance of counsel. Nor does it include convictions in which a legal defense 
could be raised, such as self-defense or failure to form the requisite intent. 
34  See, e.g., Kovarsky, supra note 12, at 448-53 (discussing primary restrictions imposed on federal habeas 
petitioners under AEDPA). 
35  Marceau, supra note 16, at 89-90 (arguing that in the wake of AEDPA, “the era of exhaustive de novo 
federal habeas review has passed”). 
36  Id. at 126 (discussing impact of AEDPA on federal habeas review). 
37  Yackle, supra note 16, at 570. 
38  28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)-(2) (2012); see also Zheng, supra note 32, at 2105-07 (discussing AEDPA’s 
statute of limitations provision as a radical departure from historical federal habeas jurisprudence). 
39  28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 
40  28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)-(2).  
41  See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995) (recognizing actual innocence as a gateway through which 
a petitioner may pass a procedural bar); cf. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 539 (2006) (suggesting actual innocence as a 
catalyst to equitable tolling of AEDPA’s statute of limitations in limited circumstances); McQuiggen v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 
1924, 1928 (2013) (holding that “actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass 
whether the impediment is a procedural bar. . . or. . . expiration of the statute of limitations” and reasoning that 
unjustifiable delay in filing is not an absolute barrier to relief, but is instead a factor in determining whether innocence has 
been reliably shown). 
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Legal scholars have been particularly critical of the statute of limitations provision based 
on its lack of support by any clear policy justification.
42
 For example, although AEDPA was 
ostensibly passed in order to curb abuses in the filing of federal habeas petitions, there is no 
support for the notion that prisoners intentionally delayed their filings prior to the passage of 
AEDPA.
43
 Nor is there a persuasive argument that convicted prisoners or their counsel would 
have any motivation to do so. To the contrary, it would be irrational for capital litigants or their 
counsel to intentionally withhold a petition until execution is imminent.
44
 Similarly, non-capital 




Additionally, the statute of limitations provision has been criticized as especially 
burdensome to pro se litigants, who must undertake the considerable task of compiling a habeas 
petition while incarcerated and without the benefit of legal counsel.
46
 Indeed, it is difficult to 
comprehend the congressional purpose behind this provision, given that prisoners are often 
uneducated and ill equipped to advance a complex legal argument.
47
 Prisoners often have limited 
access to law libraries and frequently are transferred from one facility to another without notice.
48
 
This can result in significant delay in notification of state court decisions.
49
 Thus, a prisoner may 
not learn of the denial of his state habeas petition until months after the fact.
50
 This provision 
arguably has a virtually preclusive effect on pro se litigants seeking to raise claims of innocence 
via federal habeas corpus. 
                                                                
42  Jake Sussman, Unlimited Innocence: Recognizing an “Actual Innocence” Exception to AEDPA’s Statute 
of Limitations, 27 N.Y.U. REV.  L. & SOC. CHANGE 343, 360 (2001) (“Reading the legislative history surrounding 
AEDPA’s passage, one gets the sense that the idea of an innocent prisoner failing to file a federal habeas corpus petition 
within the limitations period was simply unthinkable.”); Zheng, supra note 32, at 2131 (noting that AEDPA’s one-year 
statute of limitations “neither curbs abuse nor addresses the problem of delay”). 
43  Zheng, supra note 32, at 2131 (noting the absence of indication that federal habeas petitioners 
intentionally delay their claims and arguing that there is no motivation to do so). 
44  Id. (asserting that death row inmates have no motivation to delay filing of federal habeas petitions). 
45
 Id. (noting that a non-capital habeas litigant “has nothing to gain but everything to lose by delaying the 
filing of his federal claim: If his claim is denied, he serves the same length of time in prison whether the filing was delayed 
or not . . . if he succeeds in establishing his constitutional claim, the delay in filing would have brought him no benefit but 
a longer period of unnecessary imprisonment.”). 
46  Id. at 2131-32 (discussing the difficulty facing pro se litigants seeking to compile a federal habeas 
petition while incarcerated). 
47  See, e.g., Daniel Givelber, The Right to Counsel in Collateral, Post-Conviction Proceedings, 58 MD. L. 
REV. 1393, 1409 (1999) (arguing that the right to counsel should extend to some post-conviction proceedings); see also 
Hartung, supra note 15, at 88-89 (arguing that the increasingly complex nature of post-AEDPA federal habeas litigation 
supports a greater need for the right to counsel). 
48  See Zheng, supra note 32, at 2130 (explaining that “inmates are often transferred from one prison to 
another and may not be able to learn about a state court’s final denial [of a habeas petition] until much later”). 
49  Id. 
50  Id. 
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2. Undue Deference to State Court Decisions 
An additional criticism of AEDPA is that it has operated to obliterate federal de novo 
review of state convictions.
51
 Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
52
 provides: 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to 
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless 
the adjudication of the claim— 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States; or 
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of 
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 
This provision has been characterized as “the centerpiece of AEDPA” and is notable for 




Professor Judith Ritter argues that since the passage of AEDPA, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Williams v. Taylor
54
 seems to do away with de novo review, under 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(d)(1).
55
 Further, the Supreme Court has recently interpreted this provision of AEDPA to 
mean that a state court conclusion is “contrary to clearly established federal law” under § 
2254(d)(1) only if “no fair-minded jurist could agree” with this interpretation.
56
 Since Williams 
was decided, some federal district courts have lamented the lack of clear guidance as to what 
renders a state court determination “unreasonable.” Indeed, the Circuit Courts of Appeal remain 
split as to how this term should be applied.
57
 At one extreme, the Second Circuit has interpreted 
“unreasonable” to mean “so off the mark as to suggest judicial incompetence.”
58
 At the other, the 
Seventh Circuit has interpreted it to mean “well outside the boundaries of permissible differences 
of opinion.”
59
 And the Ninth Circuit has offered still another interpretation, applying a “clear 
                                                                
51  Ritter, supra note 13, at 59 (noting that the most critical impact of AEDPA was the movement away from 
de novo review). 
52  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012). 
53  Blume, supra note 4, at 272-73 (noting that § 2254(d)(1) has “no habeas pedigree; for example, it was not 
taken from any Supreme Court decision, like other AEDPA provisions, nor was it part of any previous habeas reform 
proposal offered by Congress or a habeas scholar.”). 
54  Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
55  Ritter, supra note 13, at 56-57 (discussing Williams v. Taylor opinion). 
56  Id. at 57 (arguing that the “no fair-minded jurist” standard is unreasonable and results in injustice in the 
post-conviction context). 
57  Id. at 64-65 (discussing split in circuits regarding interpretation of “unreasonable” in § 2254(d)(1)). 
58  Id. at 64. 
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Under any of these interpretations, the “unreasonable” standard is a difficult one. Indeed, 
state court prisoners seeking redress from federal courts face what Professor Justin Marceau calls 
“one of the most uncharitable standards of review known to law.”
61
 The impact of this provision 
has been criticized as effectively relegating the role of federal constitutional arbiter to the state, 
rather than the federal courts.
62
 
3.  Inherently Contradictory Provisions 
Additionally, the underlying policy interests that ostensibly motivated Congress in 
enacting AEDPA have been criticized as self-contradictory in at least two respects.
63
 First, there 
arguably is an inherent conflict between the interests of comity and finality when interpreting the 
provisions of AEDPA. While the exhaustion doctrine promotes comity, i.e., the notion that state 
court judgments should be respected, the statute of limitations provision promotes finality, i.e., the 
preservation of the court’s original judgment at all costs. Second, there arguably is an inherent 
conflict between the underlying principles of the exhaustion doctrine and the statute of limitations 
provisions, both codified in AEDPA.
64
 The exhaustion doctrine is based on the premise that 
federal habeas petitions should move more slowly, to ensure that all claims are raised in the state 
courts before they can be reviewed in the federal courts.
65
 By contrast, the statute of limitations 
provisions militate toward the speedy and efficient filing of federal habeas petitions.
66
 These two 
provisions are not easily reconciled, and prisoners seeking federal habeas relief must navigate 
these inherently contradictory demands.
67
 
                                                                
59  Id. at 65. 
60  Id. at 65. 
61  Id. at 81 (discussing split in circuits regarding interpretation of “unreasonable” in § 2254(d)(1)); see also 
Hartung, supra note 15, at 78 (arguing that “state courts have become final arbiters of federal constitutional law, as 
opposed to federal courts, which are presumably in a better position to play this role”). 
62  Christopher M. Johnson, Post-Trial Judicial Review of Criminal Convictions: A Comparative Study of 
the United States and Finland, 64 ME. L REV. 425, 429 (2012) (“The current deferential standard of review reflects the 
concern that federal courts, if entrusted with the power of de novo review of federal constitutional claims, will too 
frequently and improperly overturn state convictions on federal law grounds.”). 
63  Kovarsky, supra note 12, at 457-58 (discussing competing interests of comity and finality in the context 
of federal habeas review under AEDPA); Yackle, supra note 16, at 551 (discussing internal conflict present among several 
of AEDPA’s provisions). 
64  Yackle, supra note 16, at 551 (discussing internal conflict present among several of AEDPA’s 
provisions). 
65  Id.  
66  Id.  
67  See Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 29 (1997) (noting that AEDPA’s “filing deadline 
encourages prisoners to file early, while the exhaustion doctrine demands that they postpone federal habeas petitions until 
state court opportunities for litigation have been tried”); see also Hartung, supra note 15, at 82 (discussing the inherent 
tension created by conflicting goals of exhaustion doctrine and statute of limitations). 
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4.  Limits on Second or Successive Petitions 
The opportunity to file second or successive petitions has essentially been foreclosed by 
AEDPA.
68
 First, AEDPA substantially altered how federal courts address second and successive 
habeas petitions. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) operates to universally prohibit successive 
claims, i.e., those raised in previous petitions.
69
 A related provision, § 2244(b)(2), bars abusive 
claims, i.e., those not previously raised in previous petitions, with exceptions where (1) the claim 
relies on a new constitutional rule, or (2) the claim relies on newly discovered evidence not 
discoverable with due diligence.
70
 However, given that the Supreme Court has yet to recognize 
the wrongful conviction of an actually innocent defendant as a constitutional violation, a 
freestanding claim of innocence is apparently insufficient under 2244(b)(2).
71
 
Additionally, the procedural framework that AEDPA erected creates other barriers to 
prisoners seeking federal post-conviction review of their cases. Section 2244(b)(3) requires that 
any successive petition must first be presented to a panel of appellate court judges in order to 
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case under the provisions of § 2244(b).
72
 
                                                                
68  Yackle, supra note 16, at 571 (commenting that “AEDPA is so skeptical of second or successive 
petitions that it requires prisoners to obtain circuit court permission to file them at the district level”).  
69  28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (“A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under 
section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.”).  
70  28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) provides: 
A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was 
not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless (A) the applicant shows that the claim 
relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the 
Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could 
not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts 
underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient 
to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable 
factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 
§ 2244(b)(2). See also Lee Kovarsky, Original Habeas Redux, 97 VA. L. REV. 61, 91 (2011) (discussing exceptions to 
AEDPA’s general bar on abusive petitions). 
71  Joshua Lott, The End of Innocence? Federal Habeas Corpus Law After In Re Davis, 27 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 443, 453 (2011) (noting that in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), the Supreme Court held that “a substantive 
claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered post-trial evidence is not cognizable; federal habeas relief can only 
be granted when an independent constitutional violation occurred at the state criminal proceeding.”). 
72  28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) provides in full: 
(A) Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, 
the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district 
court to consider the application. (B) A motion in the court of appeals for an order authorizing the 
district court to consider a second or successive application shall be determined by a three-judge 
panel of the court of appeals. (C) The court of appeals may authorize the filing of a second or 
successive application only if it determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that 
the application satisfies the requirements of this subsection. (D) The court of appeals shall grant or 
deny the authorization to file a second or successive application not later than 30 days after the 
filing of the motion. (E) The grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second 
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This gatekeeping provision imposes an extremely onerous burden on the petitioner. It has been 
criticized as effectively allowing dismissal of petitions raising actual innocence claims that were 
not available at the time of the original petition.
73
 
These provisions, limiting—if not outright foreclosing—the opportunity to file second or 
successive federal habeas petitions under AEDPA, have a particularly acute impact on prisoners 
raising claims of actual innocence. Typically evidence supporting factual innocence tends to arise 
in an ad hoc fashion, while the petitioner is incarcerated and acting pro se.
74
 Therefore, successive 
petitions are not uncommon.
75
 Further, prisoners are motivated to file their petitions expeditiously 
in order to comply with the strict one-year limitations period.
76
 The combination of these two 
factors—ad hoc and inconsistent access to information, along with the need to comply with a 




5.  High Standard of Proof to Establish Innocence 
Finally, AEDPA has substantially raised the standard of proof imposed on prisoners 
seeking habeas relief based on actual innocence. Before AEDPA was enacted, the Supreme Court 
held in Schlup v. Delo that a claim of actual innocence should be considered under the 
fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to the procedural default doctrine in federal habeas 
litigation.
78
 Notably, Schlup required that a petitioner establish actual innocence by a mere 
preponderance of the evidence.
79
 
AEDPA has significantly altered the Schlup standard by imposing a higher standard on 
                                                                
or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for 
rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.  
§ 2244(b)(3). 
73  See, e.g., Kyle Reynolds, “Second or Successive” Habeas Petitions and Late-Ripening Claims after 
Panetti v. Quarterman, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1475, 1475 (2007) (noting that “AEDPA’s ‘gatekeeping’ provisions . . . have 
the potential to foreclose review of meritorious constitutional claims”); Williams, supra note 6, at 942 (commenting that 
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) “creates barriers that even an innocent individual is not likely to overcome”). 
74  Hartung, supra note 15, at 90 (arguing that, given the realities of post-conviction litigation, and claims of 
innocence in particular, “it is no surprise that when a pro se prisoner seeks federal habeas corpus review, the process is 
likely to occur via multiple successive petitions, each raising a new ground for relief,” since “new information may present 
itself once the petition has been filed”). 
75  Id. 
76  Id. (noting a that prisoner typically has “limited access to information and faces a one-year limitations 
period”). 
77  Id. 
78  513 U.S. at 326-27; see also Lott, supra note 71, at 454-55 (discussing the Schlup holding and its impact 
on actual innocence claims in federal habeas petitions). 
79  Lott, supra note 71, at 455 (“The Schlup test balances the innocence evidence against the reliability of the 
state’s verdict to determine ‘whether it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror viewing the record as a whole 
would lack reasonable doubt.’” (citation omitted)). 
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federal habeas petitioners claiming innocence.
80
 While the Schlup Court had required only a 
showing that new evidence was “more likely than not” to raise reasonable doubt regarding the 
petitioner’s guilt, under AEDPA, a petitioner seeking relief must establish actual innocence by 
“clear and convincing evidence.”
81
 This standard has resulted in virtual foreclosure of relief for 
petitioners raising claims of innocence.
82
 
C. Judicial Treatment of AEDPA 
Although AEDPA’s impact has been indisputably profound, in the decades preceding its 
passage, the Rehnquist Court had already definitively limited federal habeas review of state 
criminal convictions.
83
 In the absence of legislative reform, the prevailing judicial interpretation 
of federal habeas review operated to significantly curtail federal review of state convictions.
84
 
Since AEDPA’s passage, legal scholars have criticized the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of its provisions as unduly restrictive to petitioners.
85
 While initially, the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of AEDPA was widely regarded as cautious, in recent years many legal 
scholars have reached the opposite conclusion.
86
 For example, Professor Ritter has argued that, 
following an initial grace period on the heels of AEDPA’s passage, recent Supreme Court 
decisions have created the possibility of “habeas corpus relief . . . becom[ing] virtually 
unattainable.”
87
 Under either view, the standard required to convince a federal court to undermine 
a state court determination is formidable. 
There is little room for disagreement that the Supreme Court has only rarely granted 
federal habeas relief in recent years. However, there has been some debate in the legal academy as 
                                                                
80  Id. at 456 (commenting that AEDPA’s provisions were “[i]n direct contrast to Schlup’s probab[ility] 
standard” and instead required proof of innocence by “clear and convincing evidence”). 
81  Id. 
82  See, e.g., Zheng, supra note 32, at 2139-40 (arguing that courts should apply the old Schlup probability 
standard rather than AEDPA’s “clear and convincing” standard when assessing claims of actual innocence); see also 
Krystal Moore, Is Saving an Innocent Man a “Fool’s Errand”? The Limitations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act on an Original Writ of Habeas Corpus Petition, 36 DAYTON L. REV. 197, 213 (“The unreasonable standard 
required by section 2254(d)(1) is a rigid standard that bars relief for potentially innocent men.”). 
83  Ritter, supra note 13, at 58 (discussing history of Supreme Court’s treatment of federal habeas review in 
the years leading up to AEDPA, and noting that AEDPA operated to “dramatically curtail[] the availability of federal 
habeas relief”). 
84  Id. 
85  See, e.g., Burns, supra note 6, at 207 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to engage in 
counterfactual reasoning—i.e., to meaningfully address how the state court would have ruled with the benefit of newly 
discovered information—has resulted in injustice for federal habeas petitioners). 
86  See generally Blume, supra note 4 (discussing results of study of Supreme Court treatment of pre- and 
post-AEDPA habeas petitions and concluding that AEDPA’s “hype” is worse than its “bite”); see also Marceau, supra 
note 16, at 96 (contradicting Blume’s conclusion that AEDPA’s “hype” is worse that its “bite” and arguing that 
“AEDPA’s bite, though perhaps slow to manifest symptoms, has gradually and systemically infected and undermined the 
federal habeas infrastructure”). 
87  Ritter, supra note 13, at 56 (discussing impact of Supreme Court’s interpretation of AEDPA on federal 
habeas review procedures and noting the barriers imposed to obtaining relief). 
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to whether, and to what degree, the Supreme Court’s treatment of federal habeas petitions has 
been substantially altered since the passage of AEDPA in 1996.
88
 This debate has been fueled by 
the recent studies of two prominent habeas scholars, Professors John Blume and Justin Marceau. 
1. Blume Study 
Professor John Blume published the results of an empirical study comparing pre- and 
post-AEDPA Supreme Court decisions in his 2006 article, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite.”
89
 
In this study, Professor Blume reviewed all federal habeas cases decided by the Supreme Court 
during a sixteen-year period from 1990-2006, both before and after AEDPA was enacted.
90
 This 
study ultimately concluded that the success rate of petitioners seeking federal habeas relief before 
the Supreme Court essentially remained the same before and after the passage of AEDPA.
91
 
Specifically, Blume’s study revealed that of the 63 pre-AEDPA cases decided by the Supreme 
Court, the petitioner was successful 33% of the time.
92
 Comparably, of the 41 cases decided after 
AEDPA’s passage in 1996, 34% were successful.
93
 
Professor Blume opines that the reason the Supreme Court was not more definitively 
impacted by the passage of AEDPA is that the Court had already started to apply federal habeas 
review more narrowly during the decades before Congress passed legislation on this front.
94
 The 
results of Blume’s study are unaltered when federal circuit court results are reviewed, as well.
95
 
Furthermore, Blume’s study reports that the overall success rate in all federal habeas non-capital 
cases—both before and after the passage of AEDPA—is decidedly low, at less than 1%,
96
 and the 
overall success rate in capital cases is just 8%.
97
 
Finally, Blume’s study shows that federal habeas cases are increasingly decided on 
procedural grounds and more petitioners are precluded from filing.
98
 Specifically, in 1997, 52% of 
                                                                
88  Supra note 86. 
89  Supra note 86. 
90  Blume, supra note 4, at 276-77 (discussing methodology and results of survey of Supreme Court 
treatment of federal habeas cases before and after AEDPA). 
91  Id. at 277 (concluding that “a habeas petitioner’s overall success rate did not significantly change after 
AEDPA came into effect”). 
92  Id. 
93  Id. 
94  Id. at 280 (noting that when “Congress failed to act in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, a majority of the 
Supreme Court set about to ‘reform’ habeas corpus through the creation and refinement of various common law habeas 
doctrines such as procedural default, abuse of the writ, and Teague nonretroactivity”). 
95  Id. at 283 (noting that “the available data from the federal courts of appeals do not reveal that AEDPA 
has had a tremendous impact on the ability of a habeas petitioner to ultimately secure a writ of habeas corpus”).  
96  Id. at 284-85 (noting that “[l]ess than 1% of state prisoners who file federal habeas petitions ultimately 
prevail” and that “[b]oth before and after AEDPA, it is the rare state prisoner who obtains the great writ”). 
97  Id. at 285 (noting that “[f]rom 1997 to 2004, only 8% of death-sentenced inmates were successful” in 
petitioning for habeas relief). 
98  Id. at 286 (noting that “the total percentage of habeas corpus cases in the federal courts of appeals that are 
disposed of on procedural grounds, as opposed to on the merits, has risen since 1997”). 
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petitioners were denied permission to appeal from federal courts.
99
 By 2004, eight years after 
AEDPA’s passage, that figure had risen to 61%.
100
 
2. Marceau Study 
In rebuttal to Professor Blume’s study, Professor Justin Marceau conducted a more 
expansive review of federal habeas jurisprudence six years later. This study ultimately supports a 
contrary conclusion that the passage of AEDPA has indeed significantly impacted the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of federal habeas review.
101
 In his 2012 article, Challenging the Habeas 
Process Rather Than the Result, Professor Marceau looks at the shift in law and data regarding 
federal habeas corpus relief.
102
 Marceau argues that the Supreme Court has entered the “third 
phase” of federal habeas corpus review.
103
 Now that the initial criticism of AEDPA has subsided, 
the Supreme Court has begun to interpret AEDPA more harshly, frequently overturning federal 
courts that grant habeas relief against state court convictions.
104
 
Marceau’s study undermines Blume’s conclusion that AEDPA’s “hype is worse than its 
bite”—or at least suggests that it is no longer true.
105
 Marceau sought to update Blume’s study by 
expanding the data pool to include a review of cases from 1985-2011.
106
 Marceau’s study 
revealed that the relief rate in federal habeas petitions filed post-AEDPA dropped by 10 
percentage points from the pre-AEDPA relief rates. 
Specifically, while the relief rate in pre-AEDPA cases filed between 1985 and 1995 was 
37%, the post-AEDPA relief rate in cases filed from 1996-2011 dropped to 27%.
107
 However, 
Marceau notes that the disparity between pre- and post-AEDPA relief rates is even more 
pronounced when an initial grace period is taken into account. Marceau argues that the 
“suddenness with which Congress enacted AEDPA” may have caught the Court off guard.
108
 
                                                                
99  Id. 
100  Id.  
101  Marceau, supra note 16, at 96-97 (contradicting Blume’s conclusion that AEDPA’s “hype is worse than 
its bite” and arguing that “AEDPA’s bite, though perhaps show to manifest symptoms, has gradually and systemically 
infected and undermined the federal habeas infrastructure”). 
102  Id. at 98-99 (discussing empirical evidence in support of the conclusion that the Supreme Court has 
more narrowly granted federal habeas review under AEDPA). 
103  Id. at 97 (arguing that “the Court has entered a third phase in which the application of AEDPA has 
evolved so as to become increasingly harsh and the reversal of federal courts who disturb state court convictions 
increasingly brazen”).  
104  Id.  
105  Id. at 98 (“By updating Blume’s data and expanding the range of years studied, one is left with the 
impression that, as an empirical matter, Blume’s conclusion no longer holds true.”). 
106  Id. at 98-99 (noting that study expands Blume’s data “so that it now runs from 1985 through 2011 (as 
compared to 1990 through 2006)”). 
107  Id. at 101-02 (discussing methodology and results of study of Supreme Court treatment of pre- and post-
AEDPA cases). 
108  Id. at 104 (arguing that the impact of AEDPA’s restrictions on federal habeas jurisprudence were slowed 
by an initial “grace period”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
HARTUNG.FORMATTED.ROUGH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/14/2016  12:37 PM 
16 UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 19.1 
Thus, when an initial grace period is discounted from the analysis and the data from 2010-2011 is 
reviewed exclusively, the federal habeas review rate drops even more dramatically to 14%.
109
 
These findings suggest that AEDPA has had a more extreme impact on the Supreme Court’s 
approach to federal habeas review than what was initially believed. 
D.  The Debate Regarding the Role of Federal Habeas Review in Modern Jurisprudence 
In recent years, the age-old debate regarding the appropriate role of federal habeas 
review of state criminal judgments has resurfaced, with legal scholars disagreeing about the 
degree to which this final layer of review is necessary.
110
 On the one hand, some legal scholars 
have argued that federal habeas review in non-death penalty cases is superfluous.
111
 By contrast, 
others have argued that the dearth of successful federal habeas petitions supports the argument 
that federal review is even more critical. These scholars argue that this minute success-rate in 
modern, post-AEDPA jurisprudence illustrates a failure of the federal courts to perform the post-
conviction review necessary to protect the uniformity of federal law.
112
 
In his recent article, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather than the Result, Professor 
Marceau notes that “federal habeas law has reached a critical crossroads” in part as a result of 
“doctrinal shifts and empirical data” showing that federal habeas petitions are virtually never 
successful.
113
 Indeed, some legal scholars have advocated for an end to federal habeas review of 
criminal convictions, arguing that the need for such measures has passed, and characterizing 
federal habeas corpus review as “futile,” “worthless” and “illusory.”
114
 
1. Argument for Limiting Federal Habeas Review of State Convictions 
Specifically, Professors Nancy King and Joseph Hoffmann—along with other 
proponents of this approach—argue that federal habeas review arose in a political and cultural 
framework of 1960’s America that no longer exists today.
115
 During that period, the courts’ 
interpretation of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was expanded in order to accommodate for the lack 
                                                                
109  Id. at 106 (“In the past five years, the procedures and standards governing federal habeas review have 
substantially evolved so as to reduce the power of federal courts to reverse unconstitutional state convictions.”). 
110  See generally Marceau, supra note 16, at 86 (discussing recent scholarly trends regarding the role of 
federal habeas review of state criminal convictions). 
111  See generally NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:  
USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT, 146-49 (2011) (arguing that federal habeas review is an impractical 
and unnecessary remedy in non-death penalty cases). 
112   Marceau, supra note 16, at 86 (arguing that “the paucity of success by habeas petitioners does not 
naturally or necessarily justify the abandonment of federal oversight” and asserting that instead, “legal scholars and courts 
should recognize the critical role federal courts play in ensuring that the state court process is fundamentally fair”). 
113  Id. at 92 (discussing modern debate over role of federal habeas review of state criminal convictions). 
114  Id. at 131 (discussing role of federal habeas review in contemporary jurisprudence). 
115  Joseph L. Hoffman & Nancy J. King, Justice, Too Much and Too Expensive, N.Y.TIMES, Apr. 17, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/17/opinion/17hoffmann.html?_r=0 (arguing that “the federal courts remain in a 1960’s-
style habeas rut [and] continue to receive tens of thousands of habeas petitions from convicted state prisoners,” and 
asserting that federal habeas review of state court convictions is no longer necessary). 
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of adequate state court protections.
116
 Thus, as the argument goes, federal review has 
appropriately retreated in the modern era, with the understanding that states have been more 
effective at establishing post-conviction review procedures.
117
 
Professors King and Hoffman go on to argue that a “crisis of federalism” no longer exists 
as it did in the 1960’s.
118
 They further cite to the miniscule rate of federal habeas corpus relief as 
evidence that such federal review is now unnecessary,
119
 and argue that federal habeas review 
wastes precious judicial resources that could better be deployed for programs such as state 
funding of public defense counsel.
120
 Central to the King and Hoffman argument is the fact that 
very few federal habeas petitions are successful, particularly those filed in non-capital cases.
121
 
Indeed, less than 1% of federal habeas petitions are granted in non-capital cases, and over 40% of 
those claims are dismissed on procedural grounds, without any review of the petitioner’s claims 
on the merits.
122
 However, even advocates for the elimination or severe curtailing of federal 
habeas review carve out an exception where a viable claim of actual innocence is raised.
123
 
2. Argument for Expanding Federal Habeas Review of State Convictions 
On the other hand, Professor Marceau and other legal scholars have argued that federal 
review is still necessary to ensure the adequacy of state process.
124
 Specifically, Professor 
Marceau vigorously disagrees with the proposal to abolish federal habeas review, and argues that 
the “Constitution is already severely under-enforced through post-AEDPA habeas corpus 
litigation.”
125
 Further, Marceau argues that the minimal—arguably nonexistent—substantive 




                                                                
116  Marceau, supra note 16, at 90 (discussing the original rationale for expanding the Writ in the 1960’s). 
117  Id. at 90-91 (arguing that federal oversight of state court convictions is necessary in modern 
jurisprudence “to ensure the adequacy of the state processes”). 
118  Id. at 128.  
119  Id. (discussing the argument in favor of abolishing federal habeas corpus review of state criminal 
convictions). 
120  Id. 
121  Id. at 138 (discussing the low success rate of federal habeas petitions). 
122  Id. (discussing the realities of the AEDPA regime and noting the low success rate of non-capital federal 
habeas petitions). 
123  Id. at 128-29 (noting that King & Hoffman argue for the existence of non-capital federal habeas corpus 
where there is clear and convincing proof of actual innocence). 
124  Id. at 90-91 (arguing that federal review of state convictions is still necessary in the twenty-first 
century); see also Yackle, supra note 16, at 559 (identifying enduring need for federal review of state court convictions, 
and arguing that federal habeas system has completely broken down, requiring the creation of a new model “from 
scratch”). 
125  See Marceau, supra note 16, at 129 (arguing in favor of maintaining federal habeas review of state 
criminal convictions). 
126  Id. at 145 (advocating for a more expansive interpretation of AEDPA’s procedural protections). 
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3.  The Primacy of Innocence in the Federal Habeas Debate 
Even the proponents of abandoning—or radically restricting—federal habeas review 
under AEDPA, advocate for maintaining this extra layer of review in non-capital cases where 
credible claims of actual innocence are raised.
127
 Indeed the primacy of innocence has remained at 
the heart of the debate regarding federal habeas review.
128
 Given the original purpose of the Great 
Writ to provide a remedy for wrongful convictions of the innocent, both advocates and opponents 
of restricting federal habeas review agree that maintaining an effective mechanism for evaluating 




Further, there is historic support for the idea that factually innocent prisoners seeking 
federal habeas relief should be treated differently than other petitioners. For example, in Stone v. 
Powell,
130
 the United States Supreme Court determined that federal habeas relief is an 
inappropriate remedy for a prisoner raising Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule issues.
131
 The 
Court impliedly reasoned in Stone that, given the limited resources available to the federal courts, 
federal habeas review should be reserved for cases where factual innocence is raised, or at the 
very least the evidence is challenged as “inherently unreliable.”
132
 
II.   THE IMPACT OF THE INNOCENCE MOVEMENT: HOW THE EXONERATION DATA SHIFTS 
THE BALANCE IN THE FEDERAL HABEAS POLICY DEBATE 
Over the last two decades since AEDPA was enacted, the Innocence Movement has been 
instrumental in bringing about significant change in the criminal justice system. The knowledge 
that wrongful convictions of the innocent have occurred and continue to occur, at rates higher 
                                                                
127  Id. at 128-29 (arguing for limited application of federal habeas corpus review in non-capital cases, 
restricted to cases in which petitioner can raise “clear and convincing proof of factual innocence”); see also Hoffmann & 
Stuntz, supra note 5, at 85 (discussing the notion of “the primacy of innocence” in federal habeas corpus jurisprudence); 
Henry Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack in Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 142-43 (1970-
71) (arguing that “with few important exceptions, convictions should be subject to collateral attack only when the prisoner 
supplements his constitutional pleas with a colorable claim of innocence”). 
128  Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 85 (discussing the notion of “the primacy of innocence” in federal 
habeas corpus jurisprudence); see also Friendly, supra note 127, at 144 (proposing that federal habeas review apply 
exclusively to petitioners raising claims of factual innocence). 
129   Hoffman & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 85 (noting that the remedial role of habeas is most important in 
cases of innocent persons). 
130  Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
131  Vicki C. Jackson, World Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 303, 347 (2006) (noting that Stone v. 
Powell represented the palpable moment when “the tide of mistrust of state courts had turned” in the Supreme Court’s 
view of federal habeas corpus jurisprudence). 
132  Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 479 (1976) quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, at 224 
(1969) (“The primary rationale advanced in support of those decisions was that Fourth Amendment violations are different 
in kind from denials of Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights in that claims of illegal search and seizure do not ‘impugn the 
integrity of the fact-finding process or challenge evidence as inherently unreliable; rather, the exclusion of illegally seized 
evidence is simply a prophylactic device intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment violations by law enforcement 
officers.’”). 
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than ever previously imagined, has led to a much-needed reexamination of our criminal justice 
system.
133
 Specifically, the data from the first 300 DNA exonerations has suggested the 
recurrence of certain factors—such as eyewitness misidentification, coerced confession, 
prosecutorial misconduct and flawed forensic evidence—play a prominent role in wrongful 
convictions of the innocent.
134
 
The identification of these wrongful conviction factors has led to related reforms in the 
criminal justice system.
135
 However, most of these reforms have occurred at the pretrial level, and 
have focused on individual changes in police and prosecutorial procedures, rather than on 
systemic reform.
136
 Indeed, for all its successes, the Innocence Movement has been criticized for 
its failure to focus on larger-scale systemic change.
137
 
For example, Professor Tim Bakken has argued that the primary factors present in 
wrongful convictions have been well-known since Edwin Borchard published Convicting the 
Innocent,
138
 over 75 years ago in 1932.
139
 Professor Bakken further argues that the reforms 
brought to bear at the hands of the Innocence Movement in the modern era essentially mirror the 
suggestions for reform proffered nearly a century ago, in 1932.
140
 
                                                                
133  See GARRETT, supra note 2, at 6 (“DNA exonerations have changed the face of the criminal justice in 
the United States by revealing that wrongful convictions do occur and, in the process, altering how judges, lawyers, 
legislators, the public, and scholars perceive the system’s accuracy. This sea change came about because of the hard work 
of visionary lawyers, journalists, and students. . . [from the Innocence Project].”). 
134  See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 130 (2008) (“Analysis of data 
regarding known innocent convicts, from their trials through their appeals and DNA exoneration, does not provide reasons 
to be optimistic that our system effectively prevents serious factual miscarriages at trial, detects them during appeals or 
post-conviction proceedings, or remedies them through DNA testing.”). 
135   See generally Robert Norris et al., “Than That One Innocent Suffer”: Evaluating State Safeguards 
Against Wrongful Convictions, 74 ALA. L. REV. 1301 (2011) (discussing the legislative and policy reforms in the criminal 
justice system in the fifty states in the wake of the Innocence Movement); see also Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River 
Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 
655, 656 (2005) (citing the impact of DNA evidence in exposing wrongful convictions and leading to legal reforms in the 
criminal justice system).   
136  Bakken, supra note 1, at 838-39 (arguing that Innocence Movement reforms have fallen into three 
categories:  “us[ing] social science research to make police interrogations and identification procedures better, hold[ing] 
police officers, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges to higher standards, and provid[ing] more resources to 
defendants.”). 
137   Id. at 866 (arguing that the modern Innocence Movement recommendations for reform are “similar to 
those made in 1932”). 
138  EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT:  SIXTY-FIVE ACTUAL ERRORS OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE (1932). 
139  Bakken, supra note 1, at 840-41 (“In 1932, Professor Edwin Borchard published CONVICTING THE 
INNOCENT, a book in which he set out 65 cases of wrongful conviction and offered proposals for reform. The causes he 
identified for the wrongful convictions—mistaken identifications, inadequate lawyering, police or prosecutorial 
misconduct, false or coerced confessions, and perjury—are strikingly similar to those offered today by advocates for the 
wrongfully convicted. He also advocated the same kinds of relief as today’s advocates. Yet we find ourselves, seventy 
years late [in 2011], addressing the same problems and the same causes.”) (quoting Margaret Raymond, The Problem with 
Innocence, 49 CLEV ST. L. REV. 449, 463 (2001)).  
140  Id. at 866 (arguing that the modern Innocence Movement recommendations for reform are “similar to 
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Professor Bakken’s argument about the ongoing need for systemic reform in the criminal 
justice system applies with equal force in the federal post-conviction realm. While Congress 
passed AEDPA with an eye toward broad reform of federal habeas procedure, it did so without 
the benefit of the extensive exoneration data available today. Ostensibly, Congress sought to 
balance the interests of comity, federalism and finality against the countervailing interest in 
ensuring justice and fairness in criminal convictions.
141
 Today, given the newfound knowledge of 
the depths of the wrongful conviction crisis, the goal of promoting just convictions arguably 
weighs more heavily in the balance. The moment to reexamine federal habeas review is long 
overdue. 
A. The Innocence Movement: An Overview 
Since the dawn of forensic DNA testing in the early 1990’s, the Innocence Project,
142
 
along with a network of comparable legal organizations across the country, have begun to unmask 
the depth of the wrongful conviction crisis in the American criminal justice system.
143
 The 
pioneering work of these organizations has given rise to an Innocence Movement over the last 
two decades.
144
 Specifically, Innocence Network organizations [“the Network”] have been 
responsible for over 1500 exonerations.
145
 Additionally, the Network has been responsible for 
identifying the central factors giving rise to wrongful convictions and bringing about an array of 
reforms in pretrial and investigatory procedures in our criminal justice system in response.
146
 For 
example, there have been widespread calls for reform relating to police eyewitness identification 
procedures, police interrogations, and use of unverified forensic evidence since the dawn of the 
Innocence Movement.
147
 However, success in achieving these reforms has been more gradual and 
fragmented, with some states and local jurisdictions taking action more quickly than others.
148
 
                                                                
those made in 1932”). 
141  Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 67, at 4-22 (discussing the background of, and debate leading up to, the 
passage of AEDPA). 
142  The Innocence Project was established by attorneys Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld at Cardozo Law 
School in New York City in 1992. See The Innocent Project, www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent (last visited Nov. 
17, 2015). 
143  See The Innocence Project, www.innocenceproject.org/about-innocence-project/innocence-network (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2015). 
144  Hartung, supra note 15, at 69-72 (discussing the Innocence Movement and its impact on the American 
criminal justice system). 
145  See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
146  See National Registry of Exonerations, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/miss 
ion.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2015). 
147  Id. 
148  For example, to date, three state appellate courts—New Jersey, Oregon, and Massachusetts—have been 
instrumental in bringing about policy change regarding eyewitness identification procedures in their respective 
jurisdictions. See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 878-879, 915-927 (N.J. 2011) (applying more expansive scrutiny 
to police eyewitness identification procedures in response to social science research and Innocence Movement exoneration 
data); State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 690-691 (2012) (revising admissibility standards for eyewitness identification 
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The Innocence Movement has resulted in a greater focus on factual innocence in the 
courtroom, and in legal education as well.
149
 Further, significant media attention has focused on 
wrongful convictions of the innocent in recent decades.
150
 This emphasis on innocence issues—
termed “innocentrism” by Professor Daniel Medwed
151
—and the continued efforts to free actually 
innocent, wrongfully convicted prisoners, have been characterized as “the new civil rights 
movement.”
152
 In response to critics who are wary of an overemphasis on factual innocence in 
criminal prosecutions,
153
 Professor Medwed has argued that “innocentrism” is a “positive 
occurrence and one that ultimately can complement, rather than replace, the emphasis on 
substantive and procedural rights.”
154
 
B. Pre-trial Reforms in Criminal Justice System 
Most of the reforms stemming from the Innocence Movement have been adopted in the 
pretrial context in response to factors identified as playing a significant role in wrongful 
convictions, i.e., eyewitness identifications, coerced confessions, flawed forensics, and 
prosecutorial misconduct.
155
 While the calls for reform have been widespread in the last two 
decades, state courts and legislatures have been slow to respond. In fact, the success in bringing 
about policy change in the realm of investigation and pre-trial procedure has been somewhat ad 
hoc, and varies greatly from state to state. 
                                                                
evidence to reflect new understandings of unreliability in light of social science research trends); Commonwealth v. 
Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897 (Mass. 2015) (significantly expanding the scope of eyewitness identification jury instructions to 
take into account new understandings of human memory based on social science research). 
149  Daniel Medwed, Innocentrism, U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1549-50 (2008) (noting that recent focus on issues 
of factual innocence in courtrooms, classrooms, and newsrooms “derives from the emergence of DNA testing and the 
subsequent use of that technology to exoneration innocent prisoners”); see also Stephanie Roberts Hartung, Legal 
Education in the Age of Innocence: Integrating Wrongful Conviction Advocacy into the Legal Writing Curriculum, 22 
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 129 (2013) (discussing the critical role of wrongful conviction advocacy in legal education). 
150  See, e.g., Medwed, supra note 149, at 1551 (discussing the proliferation of wrongful conviction themes 
in media and pop culture). 
151   Id. 
152  See Press Release, Innocence Project, As 100th Innocent Prisoner is Freed by DNA Tests, Innocence 
Network Convenes to Map the Future of “New Civil Rights Movement” in Criminal Justice (Jan. 17, 2002), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-project-press-release-100th-innocent-prisoner-freed-dna-tests-innocence-
network-convenes-m. 
153  See, e.g., Abbe Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 315, 316-18 
(2010) (arguing that emphasis on factual innocence in the wake of the Innocence Movement has overshadowed the 
important work of defending the guilty). 
154  Medwed, supra note 149, at 1549. 
155  Bakken, supra note 1, at 838-39 (arguing that Innocence Movement reforms of criminal justice system 
have primarily focused on pretrial procedural issues relating to police eyewitness identification and interrogation 
procedures, and prosecutorial misconduct). 
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1. Eyewitness Identification 
The exoneration data stemming from the Innocence Movement has identified eyewitness 
misidentification as the leading contributing factor present in wrongful convictions, with one or 
more such identifications playing a role in more than 75% of the over 250 DNA exonerations that 
have occurred.
156
 In response to this realization, state courts and legislatures around the country 
have imposed new procedures.
157
 Specifically, courts have gradually begun to apply more 
scrutiny to eyewitness identifications, and have imposed new procedures relating to eyewitness 
identification, such as favoring blind administration by police and avoiding oral feedback to 
witnesses.
158
 Additionally, police departments increasingly favor video recording of all 
identification procedures, and the use of a single sequential photo lineup, rather than the 
presentation of a simultaneous photo array.
159
 However, while reform of eyewitness identification 
procedures has begun to take hold in a handful of states, these reforms fall short of a universal 
change in the law. 
2. Police Interrogation Procedures 
The prevalence of coerced confessions among the DNA exoneration pool has led to 
comparable reforms of police procedures in this realm as well.
160
 Of the first 300 DNA 
exonerations, 30% involved false confessions or guilty pleas.
161
 In light of the prevalence of false 
confessions in wrongful convictions of the innocent, courts increasingly favor videotaping of all 
interrogation procedures where possible.
162
 Additionally, in the wake of extensive social science 
                                                                
156  See Innocence Project, www.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction/eyewitness-
misidentification (last visited Nov. 17, 2015). 
 
157  See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 915-927 (NJ 2011) (applying more expansive scrutiny to 
police eyewitness identification procedures in response to social science research and Innocence Movement exoneration 
data); Commonwealth v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897 (Mass. 2015) (relying on findings of Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court Study Group on Eyewitness Evidence report, court issued new jury instruction template, taking into account social 
science research about the inherent unreliability of eyewitness identification accounts). 
158   See Innocence Project, www.innocenceproject.org/fix/Eyewitness-Identification.php (last visited Nov. 
17, 2015) (recommending reforms to police eyewitness identification procedures, including blind administration of live 
and photo line-up procedures, instruction to witnesses that perpetrator may not be present in line-up, and video recording 
of all identification procedures). 
159  State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (NJ 2011) (applying more expansive scrutiny to police eyewitness 
identification procedures in response to social science research and Innocence Movement exoneration data).   
160   See Innocence Project, www.innocenceproject.org/understand/False-Confessions.php (last visited Nov. 
17, 2015) (discussing prevalence of coerced confessions DNA exoneration cases and citing to legislative and judicial 
reforms). 
161   See id. (“It seems unfathomable that someone would admit to committing a crime that they had nothing 
to do with. But in more than 25 percent of the exonerations proven by DNA, that is exactly what happened.”). 
162  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423 (2013) (articulating judicial preference for 
audio and/or video recording of police interrogations and entitling defense to a jury instruction explaining that a failure to 
record can be viewed as evidence of foul play and a potentially involuntary confession). 
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research on juvenile brain development and behavior, courts have continued to apply special 
scrutiny to juvenile confessions.
163
 In particular, given the special susceptibility of juveniles to 
coercive police practices, along with the diminished ability to appreciate the long-term 
consequences of their decisions, courts have gradually begun to impose additional safeguards 
against coerced and false confessions among juveniles.
164
 
Again, reforms relating to interrogation procedures are beginning to gain favor among 
state courts and legislatures; yet these reforms have not had a universal impact on the criminal 
justice system as a whole. 
3.  Unreliable Forensic Evidence 
Finally, certain types of forensic evidence, such as bite marks, ballistics, and hair 
comparisons, have been called into question as a result of the Innocence Movement’s exoneration 
data.
165
 Although historically relied upon by prosecutors and courts as scientific evidence, these 
types of comparisons yield unreliable results, given that the techniques have never been subjected 
to the rigors of scientific analysis.
166
 The exoneration data has revealed that faulty forensic 
evidence—either unreliable methodology or deliberate falsification of results—has played a 
substantial role in wrongful convictions to date, as well.
167
 Indeed, unreliable forensic science 
played a role in 52% of the first 250 DNA exonerations.
168
 Specifically, in the wake of the 
Innocence Movement, the National Academy of Sciences has published a report concluding that 
an array of forensic methodologies historically relied upon to support criminal convictions, such 




Additionally, the FBI has recently undertaken a comprehensive review of all federal 
                                                                
163   See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 
97 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 219 (2006-2007) (analyzing social science research and quantitative and qualitative data on 
juvenile brain development and discussing policy issues including video recording, length of interrogation, and use of 
false evidence during questioning); Jennifer Walters, Illinois’ Weakened Attempt to Prevent False Confessions by 
Juveniles: The Requirement of Counsel for the Interrogations of Some Juveniles, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 487, 515-21 (2002) 
(discussing Illinois’ law requiring presence of counsel for all juvenile confessions). 
164   Feld, supra note 163, at 223-28 (discussing more lenient recent legal frameworks to provide increased 
safeguards for juveniles against self-incrimination).  
165   See Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction/unvalidated-or-
improper-forensic-science (last visited Nov. 17, 2015) (identifying forensic techniques such as hair miscroscopy, bite mark 
comparisons, firearm tool mark analysis, and shoe print comparison as unreliable and untested by sufficient scientific 
evaluation). 
166   Id. 
167   Id. 
168  Daniel Medwed, Introduction: Path Forward or Road to Nowhere? Implications of the 2009 National 
Academy of Sciences Report on the Forensic Sciences, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 221, 221 (2010) (discussing role of faulty 
forensic evidence in DNA exoneration data). 
169  Id. at 221-222 (discussing the significance of the 2009 Report of the National Academy of Sciences 
[“NAS Report”], and noting that the NAS Report supports a conclusion that “there are problems with the manner in which 
forensic science is (a) initially produced and (b) later presented as evidence in criminal trials.”). 
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prosecutions in which hair comparison analysis was relied upon in securing the convictions. In 
doing so, the FBI and the U.S. Attorney’s Office have collectively recognized the fundamental 
unreliability of—and lack of scientific support for—hair comparison evidence.
170
 
C.  Recalibrating the Policy Equation: Finality vs. Fairness in the Age of Innocence 
While the Innocence Movement has been the impetus for an array of pre-trial and 
investigatory reforms, discussed in Section IIB above, these measures have been adopted state by 
state, with no national uniformity. Additionally, very few comparable reforms have occurred in 
the post-conviction context, and even fewer in the federal realm. In fact, AEDPA, the legislation 
passed to overhaul federal habeas corpus review of state convictions, was enacted before the 
Innocence Movement was in full swing.
171
 
Thus, the debate leading up to the passage of AEDPA in 1996 focused on balancing the 
competing interests of comity and finality on the one hand, and the interests of justice and fairness 
on the other.
172
 Yet the exoneration data stemming from the Innocence Movement over the last 
several decades warrants a recalibration of these underlying policy interests. At the time Congress 
debated the provisions of AEDPA, the American criminal justice system was still widely regarded 
as an error-free model for the world. Indeed, as of 1996, fewer than 30 known DNA exonerations 
had occurred.
173
 Today, that number has expanded 50-fold, and it is widely understood that the 
current exonerations represent the mere “tip of the iceberg” with thousands, if not tens of 
thousands, of factually innocent prisoners remaining incarcerated.
174
 
Surely the undisputed knowledge that our criminal justice system was, and is, subject to 
a significant error rate, would have altered the congressional debate when AEDPA was enacted. It 
is eminently reasonable, in the interest of judicial economy, comity, and finality, for there to be a 
limit on the scope of review for a convicted prisoner. And in this vein, it is not surprising that 
Congress sought to curtail federal habeas review to conserve resources, demonstrate respect for 
state judgments, and curb what was widely regarded as rampant “abuse of the writ.”
175
 Given that 
                                                                
170  See Scientists Applaud FBI’s Decision to Review Reliability of Forensic Hair Analysis, MINTPRESS 
NEWS, July 25, 2013, http://www.mintpressnews.com/scientists-applaud-fbis-decision-to-review-reliability-of-forensic-
hair-analysis/165917/ (“The FBI said that in more than 2,000 cases from 1985 to 2000, analysts may have exaggerated the 
significance of hair analyses or reported them inaccurately.”). 
171  Hartung, supra note 15, at 69-70 (“While Congress sought to address the unrestricted filing of 
‘frivolous’ federal habeas petitions by obviously guilty prisoners, the fact that significant numbers of these petitioners 
were wrongfully convicted and factually innocent was not yet widely known and did not seem to enter the debate.”) 
(citation omitted). 
172   Id. at 68 (noting that AEDPA “ostensibly sought to balance the competing interests of finality and 
fairness, by limiting the seemingly endless review of criminal judgments while ensuring a just result for the convicted.”). 
173  See The Cases: DNA Exoneree Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-
false-imprisonment/front-page#c10=published&b_start=0&c4=Exonerated+by+DNA (last visited Nov. 17, 2015). 
174  Medwed, supra note 149, at 1564 (referencing Sam Gross’ conclusion that the number of wrongful 
convictions of the innocent is “unknown and frustratingly unknowable”); Rachel Pecker, Note, Quasi-Judicial Prosecutors 
and Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence: Granting Recusals to Make Impartiality a Reality, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1609, 
1612-13 (2013) (discussing the impact of the Innocence Movement and characterizing the excess of 2,000 exonerations 
and 300 DNA exonerations as the “tip of the iceberg”). 
175  See Reynolds, supra note 73, at 1478-79 (discussing political climate at the time AEDPA was enacted, 
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conviction of the factually innocent was not explicitly discussed in the congressional hearings on 
AEDPA, it can be presumed that the existence of a significant rate of wrongful convictions of the 
innocent did not enter the debate.
176
 
Today, nearly two decades after AEDPA’s passage, the crisis of wrongful convictions in 
the United States cannot be ignored. In this era, with full knowledge of the exoneration data 
stemming from the Innocence Movement, it is difficult to imagine how Congress would pass 
legislation that operates to virtually foreclose claims of innocence. While viable innocence claims 
were once considered an anomaly, they are now known to occur far more frequently than was 
ever imagined. In light of this new reality, the appropriate scope of federal review must be 
revisited. Further, given the inability of pretrial procedural reforms to fully address and correct the 
wrongful convictions crisis, a systemic reform of federal habeas review is warranted. 
III.  PRE-TRIAL INNOCENCE TRACKS: THE PROPOSAL AND THE CRITIQUE 
While no legal scholar has proposed a federal post-conviction innocence track since the 
passage of AEDPA, some have proffered a comparable innocence track in the pretrial context.
177
 
The pretrial innocence track model laudably seeks to provide well-deserved protections for 




A. The Pretrial Innocence Track Proposal 
Although not yet implemented in any jurisdiction, several legal scholars have proposed 
the establishment of an optional “innocence track” or “innocence bureau” which would present an 
alternative to the traditional trial track.
179 
This model is premised on the notion that factually 
innocent criminal defendants require procedures specifically designed to separate them from the 
large majority of defendants who are factually guilty.
180 
While the specifics of this model vary 
                                                                
with national security at the forefront of the congressional agenda, along with concerns about federal courts “besieged by” 
habeas petitions); Hartung, supra note 15, at 69 (noting that, in passing AEDPA, “Congress sought to address the 
unrestricted filing of ‘frivolous’ federal habeas petitions by obviously guilty prisoners.”). 
176  See Ritter, supra note 13, at 72 (noting that most congressional debate leading up to the passage of 
AEDPA focused on provisions relating to terrorism, wiretapping, and immigration, with very little discussion of the post-
conviction measures). 
177  See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger & Lesley C. Risinger, Innocence Is Different: Taking Innocence into 
Account in Reforming Criminal Procedure, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 869, 893-94 (2011) (advocating for pre-trial 
innocence track as a measure to protect against wrongful convictions). 
178  Id. at 871 (noting that “the defense bar may fear that some reforms will bring new disadvantages to the 
majority of their clients (the factually guilty ones) for the benefit of the innocent minority.”). 
179  See, e.g., Keith A. Findley, Adversarial Inquisitions: Rethinking the Search for the Truth, 56 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 911, 920-23 (2011) (discussing “innocence procedures” proposed by legal scholars, including Tim Bakken, 
Lewis Steel and Michael and Lesley Risinger); see also Risinger & Risinger, supra note 177, at 893-94 (advancing a 
proposal allowing for a defendant to “elect between two tracks [, the factual innocence track and the traditional track] 
which would determine both the structure of further pretrial proceedings and the rules by which the trial itself would be 
conducted.”). 
180  Bakken, supra note 1, at 839 (“Innocent persons need procedures to separate themselves from the large 
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among the various legal scholars who have proposed it, the approach allows criminal defendants 
to opt into a pretrial “innocence track” in exchange for relinquishing fundamental constitutional 
protections, such as the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
181 
Specifically, those who opt into the innocence track would have the benefit of enhanced 
investigation procedures and a higher burden of proof imposed on the prosecution,
182
 and would 
be entitled to an acquittal upon evidence that the government acted in bad faith.
183
 In exchange, 
the defendant would agree to testify at trial and be available for a formal pretrial deposition before 
the trial judge.
184
 Under this proposed innocence track, the defense would also be entitled to full 
access to the prosecution’s files, pursuant to an open discovery provision.
185
 
This model further envisions a certain streamlining of the process.  Specifically, prior to 
trial, the defendant would identify the “binary issues of fact upon which his factual guilt or 
innocence turns”
186
—i.e., identity of the perpetrator—and would concede uncontested issues such 
as the perpetrator’s state of mind or intent.
187
 Finally, under this model, the role of crime 
investigation would be shared and would not fall exclusively within the purview of the 
prosecution.
188
 Presumably, this option would help separate the proverbial wheat from the chaff, 
in order to identify the truly innocent defendants.
 
B.  Criticism of Pretrial Innocence Tracks 
While the pretrial innocence track proposal holds a superficial appeal in that it seeks to 
                                                                
majority of guilty persons in the justice system.”). 
181  See, e.g., Risinger & Risinger, supra note 177, at 894 (“The ‘factual innocence’ track would require the 
defendant to make a limited waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination, in that the defendant would commit himself 
to testify at trial, and also make himself available for a formal pretrial deposition in front of, and to be conducted primarily 
by, the judge.”). 
182  Tim Bakken, Truth and Innocence Procedures to Free Innocent Persons: Beyond the Adversarial 
System, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 545, 549 (2008) (“The government would be required to prove guilt to a higher 
standard than beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
183   Id. at 550 (“Jurors could acquit the defendant upon finding that the government acted in bad faith.”). 
184  Risinger & Risinger, supra note 177, at 894 (“The ‘factual innocence’ track would require the defendant 
to make a limited waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination, in that the defendant would commit himself to testify 
at trial, and also make himself available for a formal pretrial deposition in front of, and to be conducted primarily by, the 
judge.”). 
185  Id. at 887 (2011) (calling for “at the very least . . . discovery reform, including the adoption of reciprocal 
so-called ‘open file’ discovery.”) (emphasis in original). 
186  Id. at 894. 
187  Id. (“The point of such a trial would be to try the one or two issues identified by the defendant as the 
binary issues of fact upon which his factual guilt or innocence turns. The election would therefore operate as an admission 
that the state of mind of the perpetrator was such as to qualify for conviction under the top count of the indictment.”). 
188  Id. (“[A factual innocence track] would . . . , by eliminating the prosecution's virtual monopoly on 
investigation, foster a true adversary system in which the adversaries concentrate on their epistemically valuable functions 
of marshalling, explaining, and testing the implications of the facts, and not on producing, massaging, and malleating the 
facts.”). 
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apply necessary special scrutiny to claims of innocence, a closer examination reveals significant 
practical concerns. In fact, pretrial innocence track proposals have been met with criticism in the 
legal scholarship from all sides. For example, some legal scholars and prominent prosecutors have 
argued that such an approach would result in freeing the guilty with a slim possibility of doing 
much to aid the truly innocent.
189
 Specifically, Professor Paul Cassell has argued that such special 
procedures are implausible and not necessary to protect the innocent.
190
 For example, Cassell 
asserts that the prosecution could rarely meet a burden higher than the standard “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” applied in criminal trials.
191
 Cassell further argues that the innocence track 
model lacks an effective method of preventing factually guilty defendants from invoking the 
procedures.
192
 Professor Tim Bakken rebuts Cassell’s argument regarding false claims of 




On the other side, detractors from the defense bar have argued that pretrial innocence 
tracks are not viable because participation necessarily depends on defendants relinquishing their 
constitutional rights.
194
 For example, compelling a defendant to waive his or her Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination would arguably result in a presumption that those 
defendants not choosing the innocence track declare their guilt by default.
195
 This approach would 
run afoul of the presumption of innocence as well. Notably, if this procedure were to ever become 
widely administered, jurors would find themselves in the position of determining guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt with the implicit knowledge that the defendant had opted not to declare factual 
innocence.
196




Additionally, some pretrial innocence track proposals require that defense counsel 
                                                                
189  See, e.g., Bakken, supra note 1, at 847 (discussing Paul Cassell’s criticism of pretrial innocence track 
proposal). 
190   Paul G. Cassell, Freeing the Guilty Without Protecting the Innocent: Some Skeptical Observations on 
Proposed New “Innocence” Procedures, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2011/12) (disputing the need for additional 
pretrial and trial measures to protect innocent defendants). 
191  Id. 
192  Bakken, supra note 1, at 848 (discussing Cassell’s opposition to the pretrial innocence proposal). 
193   Id. 
194  See, e.g., Risinger & Risinger, supra note 177, at 894 (noting that pre-trial innocence tracks necessarily 
require waiver of constitutional rights); see also Hartung, supra note 15, at 86 (noting likelihood of opposition from 
defense bar given that this approach “would have the de facto effect of dividing criminal defendants into two definitive 
camps: those who admit their guilt and those who do not.”). 
195  Id. 
196  Although there is a distinction to be made between a defendant claiming factual versus legal 
innocence—with the former eligible to opt into the innocence track, but not the latter—this distinction may be lost on a 
jury. For example, a defendant disputing the requisite intent in a murder case, but not the identity of the perpetrator, would 
be no less entitled to an acquittal in spite of being precluded from the innocence track. Nonetheless, a jury might conclude 
that such a defendant falls outside the “innocence track” and thus, reach an unsupported guilty verdict. 
197  See, e.g., Bakken, supra note 1, at 845-46 (noting that under innocence procedures “defendants could 
compel enhanced investigations by waiving the right to remain silent and agreeing to an interview.”). 
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submit an affidavit affirming a personal belief in her client’s factual innocence.
198
 Thus, the 
enhanced investigation and other innocence track protections would not take place until after such 
an affidavit was submitted.
199
 This approach would seem to run counter to an array of Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel protections. Specifically, the requirement of an “innocence 
affirmation” would improperly place defense counsel in the simultaneous role of defense attorney, 
prosecutor, judge, and jury. 
For example, requiring an attorney to publically state his or her opinion as to a client’s 
innocence would flagrantly violate the attorney-client privilege, as presumably, such a declaration 
would depend at least in part on what the defendant reported to his or her attorney during their 
consultations. Further—and perhaps even more problematically—an attorney’s failure to file such 
an affidavit would, by default, arguably amount to a public statement of belief in the client’s 
factual guilt, or, at a minimum, a lack of confidence in the client’s factual innocence. This 
approach would no doubt create conflict in the attorney-client relationship as well, particularly 
where the attorney is unwilling to file an affirmation of innocence. 
For all these reasons, the pretrial innocence track model has yet to be implemented in 
any U.S. jurisdiction, and seems unlikely to be adopted any time in the near future. 
IV.  THE CASE FOR A FEDERAL POST-CONVICTION INNOCENCE TRACK 
Unlike the proposed pre-trial innocence track discussed in Part III above, a federal post-
conviction innocence track would more effectively achieve the goals of accuracy in criminal 
convictions and substantive justice, without running counter to fundamental constitutional rights. 
This approach would also further the original purpose of the Great Writ.
200
 In addition, a 
comprehensive reexamination of federal habeas review and imposition of a post-conviction 
innocence track would help bring about the systemic change absent from the Innocence 
Movement reforms achieved to date. 
Federal habeas review, in the wake of AEDPA, is widely regarded as an unmitigated 
disaster.
201
 Indeed, there is support for the argument that federal habeas procedure is well past due 
for an overhaul.
202
 The pretrial procedural reforms stemming from the Innocence Movement, 
discussed in Part IIB above, are a promising step in the right direction, but lack uniformity among 
the states.
203
 Further, there is a decided lack of uniformity among state post-conviction procedures 
as well.
204
 Thus, a petitioner raising a post-conviction claim of actual innocence is likely to 
                                                                
198  Id. at 848 (noting that, under the innocence track approach, “defense attorneys would have to affirm 
their clients’ innocence by submitting an innocence affirmation.”). 
199  Id. 
200  Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 85 (noting that “nowhere is the remedial role of habeas so 
important as in the case of an innocent person.”). 
201  Yackle, supra note 16, at 553 (commenting that federal habeas corpus review for state prisoners is an 
“intellectual disaster area”). 
202  Id. (acknowledging that AEDPA has failed to effectively restructure federal habeas review, and 
advocating for the need to “start over”). 
203  See supra notes 155-70, and accompanying text. 
204  See Medwed, supra note 135, at 681 (discussing the array of “current modes of collateral relief” in the 
state post-conviction realm). 
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receive disparate results depending on the jurisdiction where the underlying conviction 
occurred.
205
 For this reason, a larger scale reform of the federal habeas review process—
universally available to all prisoners convicted in state courts—is a more effective way to bring 
about systemic change. 
What’s more, to the extent that these pretrial reforms stemming from the Innocence 
Movement have been successfully implemented, they essentially operate as preventative measures 
to avoid wrongful convictions of the innocent in the future.
206
 On the other hand, reforming 
federal habeas procedures for petitioners raising claims of innocence would help solve a different 
problem: correcting wrongful convictions that have already occurred. Both kinds of reform are 
necessary to meaningfully address the wrongful convictions crisis. 
A. Historical Support for a Federal Post-Conviction Innocence Track 
In the decades leading up to the Due Process Revolution of the 1950’s and 60’s, federal 
habeas courts routinely failed to differentiate between innocence and non-innocence claims.
207
 
This approach was logical at a time when the only viable habeas corpus claims were based on due 
process claims of an erroneous verdict.
208
 However, today, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 
years of expansive interpretation of due process, an array of constitutional claims exist which are 
completely unrelated to factual guilt or innocence.
209
 Thus, in modern jurisprudence, actual 
innocence plays “only a small role” in adjudication of habeas corpus petitions.
210
 
Decades before AEDPA was enacted, a debate ensued among legal scholars as to the 
appropriate scope and focus of federal habeas review.
211
 In spite of the “small role” that 
innocence claims were recognized to play in federal review of state convictions, over the last 




1.  Friendly Article 
In 1970, Judge Henry Friendly wrote an influential article, arguing that the Great Writ 
                                                                
205   Id. 
206  See generally supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text. 
207  Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 87-88 (discussing how the types of constitutional challenges have 
greatly expanded in the decades following the “due process revolution” at the hands of the Warren Court). 
208   Id. at 88. 
209  KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 111, at 10 (“The Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice 
Earl Warren and Justice William J. Brennan, responded to recurring and serious injustices inflicted upon state criminal 
defendants—especially minorities and the poor—by interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
require the states to provide defendants with various new federal rights.”). 
210  Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 92. 
211  See generally supra notes 111-26 and accompanying text. 
212  See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 127, at 142 (arguing that federal habeas review of state convictions should 
focus exclusively on innocence claims); Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 5 (proposing pre-AEDPA “innocence track” in 
federal post-conviction context). 
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had strayed from its original purpose and that federal habeas corpus review should focus 
exclusively on claims of actual innocence.
213
 Judge Friendly’s argument appeared to be premised 
on the notion that the number of federal habeas petitions filed each year had reached 
unmanageable levels, and a focus on exclusively innocence petitions would dramatically reduce 




Although not explicitly stated, Judge Friendly’s premise that actually innocent prisoners 
were exceedingly rare, if not virtually nonexistent, provided the undercurrent for his argument.  
Indeed, his proposal seemed to rely on notions of judicial economy—i.e., that restricting petitions 
to colorable claims of actual innocence would significantly limit the number of filings.
215
 Yet, 
when Judge Friendly wrote this article, he could not have foreseen the depth of the wrongful 
conviction crisis to be revealed by the Innocence Movement in the decades to come.
216
 
2. Hoffmann & Stuntz Article: The Original “Innocence Track” Proposal 
Subsequently, in 1993, Professors Joseph Hoffmann and William Stuntz advocated for 
an “innocence track” in federal habeas procedure, where review of such claims would be de novo 
and relief could be based solely on a “naked innocence claim,” even if unaccompanied by a 
separate constitutional claim.
217
 In their influential article, Habeas After the Revolution, 
Hoffmann and Stuntz argued that an innocence track would serve to promote the dual purposes of 
federal habeas review: 1) the protection of the innocent, and 2) deterrence of constitutional 
violations by police, prosecutors, and judges.
218
 
Hoffmann and Stuntz further discussed the notion that innocence claims should be 
treated differently than non-innocence claims in habeas proceedings.
219
 Indeed the crux of their 
proposal was that habeas law should be premised, at least in part, “on the recognition that habeas 
can provide a valuable layer of protection against the unjust punishment of innocent 
defendants.”
220
 In support of their argument, the authors cited Stone v. Powell, where the Supreme 
                                                                
213  Friendly, supra note 127, at 142 (arguing that “with a few important exceptions, convictions should be 
subject to collateral attack only when the prisoner supplements his constitutional pleas with a colorable claim of 
innocence.”). 
214  Id. at 144 (arguing that the number of federal habeas petitions was overwhelming the courts as of 1970, 
“compris[ing] the largest single element in the civil caseload of the [federal] district courts”); see also David Wolitz, 
Innocence Commissions and the Future of Post-Conviction Review, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1027, 1038 (2010) (noting that Judge 
Friendly’s proposal placed “greater emphasis on actual innocence over procedural violations,” thus resulting in more 
“attention on the most deserving petitioners”). 
215  Friendly, supra note 127, at 148 (commenting that the “most serious single evil with today’s 
proliferation of . . .  [federal habeas petitions] is its drain upon the resources of the community—judges, prosecutors, and 
attorneys appointed to aid the accused”). 
216  Id. (characterizing federal habeas petitions as a “gigantic waste of effort”). 
217  Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 96-97. 
218  Id. at 108 (discussing dual purpose of federal habeas review). 
219  Id. at 85 (citing to Stone v. Powell for support for the proposition that innocence claims should be 
differentiated from other constitutional claims). 
220  Id. at 95. 
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Court determined that Fourth Amendment search and seizure issues were not appropriate claims 
under federal habeas corpus, partly given that they were unrelated to guilt or innocence.
221
 
Additionally, the authors argued that the historical focus on federalism in the habeas 
debate is outdated, and that instead, the debate should focus on how federal habeas procedures are 
part of the criminal justice system, rather than a separate entity.
222
 Specifically, the authors argued 
that federal habeas review should be viewed as a critical part of the criminal justice system, rather 
than merely as an ancillary constitutional review, along of the lines of a § 1983 federal civil rights 
claim.
223
 Hoffmann and Stuntz asserted that, in furtherance of the goals of “protecting innocence, 
deterring unreasonable state court decision making, and providing sufficient opportunities for 
federal lawmaking,” federal habeas procedures should be reformed.
224
 
Under Hoffmann and Stuntz’s proposal, eligibility for the innocence track would require 
a petitioner to make a threshold showing of a “reasonable probability of innocence.”
225
 Further, a 
petitioner filing any federal habeas claim would be eligible, regardless of whether the claim is 
otherwise subject to procedural default.
226
 Thus, the petitioner could obtain habeas review of the 
constitutionality of the convictions by demonstrating: (1) a “reasonable probability” of factual 




Hoffmann and Stuntz envisioned that this approach would lead to habeas review on the 
merits of all claims relating to the failure of the government to disclose material evidence, along 
with innocence-related claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and insufficiency of 
evidence.
228
 The authors reasoned that the “reasonable probability” standard essentially amounted 
to the same standard as those required for these constitution-based claims.
229
 This approach was 
designed to benefit habeas petitioners raising claims of actual innocence because it would operate 
to waive any potential procedural default.
230
 In their article, Hoffmann and Stuntz argued that the 
                                                                
221  Id. at 92. 
222  Id. at 122 (referring to the federal habeas corpus debate as “sterile” and arguing that it is “time to change 
the terms of the discussion”). 
223  Id. at 70 (“The categorization of habeas as a member of the class of federal remedies for constitutional 
violations by state and local officials is not wrong; on the contrary, it is both correct and important. But it is also 
misleading, for habeas is part of another system as well—the criminal justice system. And the criminal justice system is 
quite different, substantively and procedurally, from the other settings in which federal constitutional law is enforced 
against state and local actors.”). 
224  Id. at 123. 
225  Id. at 95. 
226  Id. 
227  Id. 
228  Id. at 95-96 (“Our approach would lead to habeas review on the merits of all claims that the government 
failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence, since our proposed ‘reasonable probability of innocence’ standard is the 
same as that for showing ‘materiality’ under existing Brady doctrine. It would also mean habeas review of all innocence-
related ineffective assistance of counsel claims: once again, the standard is the same. And it would mean habeas review of 
all Jackson v. Virginia claims, which go directly to the sufficiency of the evidence of the defendant’s guilt.”). 
229  Id. at 95. 
230  Id. at 96 (“The contrary rule in existence today rests on the notion that the state’s interests in finality and 
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existing approach under federal habeas law reflected an emphasis on finality of state judgments 
over the interest of correcting wrongful convictions of the innocent.
231
 Finally, Hoffmann and 
Stuntz emphasize that their model is rooted in the fundamental purpose of habeas review—i.e., 
preventing injustice—rather than correcting state courts.
232
 
While the Hoffmann and Stuntz innocence track proposal contemplates coupling an 
innocence claim with an allegation of a related constitutional violation, their approach also allows 
for a “‘naked’ innocence claim” of the type raised in Herrera v. Collins.
233
 The authors 
acknowledge that such a bare claim of innocence would potentially require a higher standard of 
proof.
234
 While the proposal does not definitively set a proposed standard of establishing 
innocence under these circumstances, the authors contemplate a “more likely than not” or “clear 
and convincing evidence” standard.
235
 
However, in proposing a federal habeas innocence track in 1993, Hoffmann and Stuntz 
could not have foreseen the wreckage that AEDPA would bring to bear just three years after the 
publication of their article. While the authors recommended taking steps to ensure greater 
protection for petitioners raising claims of actual innocence, the passage of AEDPA in 1996 had 
exactly the opposite impact.
236
 
B. The Inability of State Post-Conviction Procedures to Adequately Address Actual Innocence Claims 
Given that AEDPA has operated to severely curtail federal habeas review of state 
convictions, state collateral review of a conviction now amounts to the only viable venue for 
constitutional review of one’s convictions.
237
 Indeed, some scholars have argued that federal 
review of state convictions is no longer warranted because state post-conviction review 
procedures are effective in addressing viable claims of actual innocence.
238
 However, no proof 
                                                                
the enforcements of procedural rules outweigh the interest of a potentially innocent defendant in avoiding punishment.  
This balance . . . reflects the current law’s preoccupation with federalism concerns, a preoccupation that is out of place 
with the wholly nationalized body of law that state courts apply to resolve criminal procedure disputes.”). 
231  Id. (commenting that “the goal of habeas relief on this ‘innocence track’ is not to send signals to the state 
courts but to prevent injustice to the defendant”). 
232  Id. at 95-96 (noting that the authors’ proposal would “provide a valuable layer of protection against the 
unjust punishment of innocent defendants” and “would justify habeas review of the merits of the defendant’s federal 
claims without regard to any possible procedural deficiencies”). 
233  Id. at 97 (noting that “we would not preclude habeas relief even for a ‘naked’ innocence claim of the 
kind that was presented to the Court . . . in Herrera v. Collins [113 S Ct 853 (1993)]”). 
234  Id. at 97-98 (recognizing that “there is much room for disagreement about what the proper standard for 
such ‘naked’ innocence claims ought to be”). 
235  Id. at 98 (noting that “presumably it should be harder for a defendant to obtain habeas review by 
claiming innocence alone than by coupling an innocence claim with a claim of constitutional violation” and suggesting 
“more likely than not” innocence or “clear and convincing evidence” of innocence as possible standards). 
236  See generally supra notes 27-82 and accompanying text. 
237  See Medwed, supra note 135, at 681 (discussing “current modes of collateral relief” in the state post-
conviction realm); see also Williams, supra note 6, at 920 (noting the failure among state courts to provide meaningful 
review of state convictions, especially in capital cases). 
238  See Blume, supra note 4, at 263 (discussing views of “habeas detractors” who regard “punishing and 
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exists that this is the case. 
Most states now provide for some procedure for collateral attack of a conviction, such as 
state habeas corpus or coram nobis.
239
 These procedures may be based on common law or, more 
frequently, codified in statute or court rule.
240
 However, the effectiveness of these state post-
conviction procedures in identifying meritorious claims of actual innocence is not clear. Indeed, 
studies suggest that state habeas proceedings fail to adequately remedy constitutional errors 
occurring at the trial level.
241
 For example, a Texas study concluded that state post-conviction 




Further, state habeas and other post-conviction procedures have been criticized as 
duplicative and unnecessarily complex.
243
 Particularly in jurisdictions where these measures 
coexist with motion for new trial procedures, the multiple layers of relief available can result in 
conflicting standards, and can ultimately cause confusion among litigants.
244
 
These inefficiencies, and the apparent failure of state court collateral review of 
convictions to adequately identify and address viable claims of innocence, support the need to 
strengthen federal habeas procedures, rather than abandon them.
245
 While some legal scholars 
have argued that federal habeas review of state convictions is no longer necessary in the modern 
era, where states are well-equipped to handle their own post-conviction review processes,
246
 it is 
difficult to gauge how successful state courts actually are in undertaking these review measures 
on their own. 
For example, under AEDPA, § 2254(d)(2) provides a mechanism for litigating 
procedural unfairness in state post-conviction procedures when a state court decision is “based on 
an unreasonable determination of the facts.”
247
 Yet given that many states, such as California, 
                                                                
controlling crime as . . . a quintessential state function”). 
 
239   See Medwed, supra note 135, at 681 (discussing “current modes of collateral relief” in the state post-
conviction realm). 
240  Id. (noting this “shift from common law systems of state post-conviction relief in favor of statute- and 
rule-based regimes”). 
241   See, e.g., Sussman, supra note 42, at 366 (discussing high error rates in state capital cases, and noting 
that errors often go uncorrected in state post-conviction procedures). 
242  Texas Defender Service, A State of Denial: Texas Justice and the Death Penalty, Chapter 8, 127, 
available at: http://texasdefender.org/tds-publications/. 
243  Medwed, supra note 135, at 696 (“While the presence of multiple remedies at the state court level may 
seem desirable or at least better than the alternatives, a single option or no remedy at all, the interrelationship between 
these devices within any given jurisdiction can be perplexing.”). 
244  Id. (discussing Tennessee state post-conviction procedures in particular, and identifying conflict between 
requirements for introducing new evidence via motion for new trial versus post-conviction relief). 
245  Marceau, supra note 16, at 198 (arguing that rather than abandoning federal oversight of state 
convictions, federal oversight should be reoriented “so that it serves, at the very least, the critical function of ensuring the 
fairness of the state process”). 
246  See supra notes 114-22 and accompanying text. 
247  See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text. 
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deny thousands of habeas petitions per year through summary dispositions, it is impossible to 




C.  Need for Continued Federal Oversight of State Court Convictions 
While federal habeas review is controversial, there is broad support for the notion that 
review and enforcement of federal constitutional rights should not be left exclusively to the state 
courts.
249
 The original rationale for federal habeas review—i.e., the notion that federal courts are 
better equipped to interpret federal constitutional rights—applies with equal force today.
250
 
One prominent federal habeas scholar, Professor Larry Yackle, has argued in favor of the 
“enduring idea that federal rights implicated in criminal cases should not be left to state courts 
alone,” because these “courts may answer in ordinary civil litigation when federal issues emerge, 
but not when the safeguards drawn from the Bill of Rights are at stake.”
251
 In support of his 
argument, Professor Yackle looks to the historic rationale for federal habeas corpus review: the 




D. Need to Correct AEDPA’s Disproportionate Impact on Petitioners Raising Claims of Actual Innocence 
As discussed in Part IB above, many of AEDPA’s provisions have had a 
disproportionate impact on prisoners raising claims of actual innocence. For example, AEDPA’s 
strict one-year filing period, in combination with its limitation on second and successive petitions, 
operates to foreclose petitions raising innocence claims.
253
 Indeed many such petitions are denied 
based on threshold procedural violations, without ever reaching the merits of the issues raised.
254
 
Additionally, the exceedingly high standard required to show that newly discovered 
evidence supports a finding of actual innocence erects onerous barriers to federal habeas review, 
as well.
255
 Indeed, rather than establishing that new evidence supports a finding of innocence by a 
preponderance of the evidence, as was historically required under federal common law, AEDPA’s 
imposition of a gateway requirement of “clear and convincing evidence” of innocence has been 
                                                                
248  Marceau, supra note 16, at 154. 
249  Yackle, supra note 16, at 553 (arguing that in modern society, the Supreme Court can no longer shoulder 
alone the burden of review of federal constitutional rights for the state courts). 
250  Id. at 556 (arguing that, unlike state courts, “federal courts . . . can concentrate on federal rights 
unimpaired by any competing commitment to local criminal law”). 
251  Id. at 559. 
252  Id. at 556 (noting that, unlike state courts, “federal courts . . . can concentrate on federal rights 
unimpaired by any competing commitment to local criminal law”). 
253  See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text. 
254  Blume, supra note 4, at 286 (noting that “the total percentage of habeas corpus cases in the federal 
courts of appeals that are disposed of on procedural grounds, as opposed to on the merits, has risen since 1997”). 
255  See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text. 
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criticized as insurmountable.
256
 This high standard is problematic standing alone, but even more 
so when viewed in light of AEDPA’s provisions eviscerating federal de novo review of state court 
options.
257
 The combination of these provisions results in effectively foreclosing federal habeas 
relief based on actual innocence.
258
 
The irony of this disparate impact of AEDPA’s provisions is that the de facto victims—
the prisoners raising claims of actual innocence—are the intended beneficiaries of federal habeas 
corpus review. Thus, in enacting AEDPA, rather than merely curing the perceived “abuse of the 
writ,” Congress restricted access to federal habeas review so as to effectively foreclose relief for 
the guilty and innocent alike. A radical restructuring of AEDPA is warranted to correct this 
problem. As a starting point, creating a separate track for prisoners raising claims of innocence 
would operate to focus the limited resources of the federal courts on the most deserving litigants. 
V.  FEDERAL POST-CONVICTION INNOCENCE TRACK: A PROPOSED CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK 
The federal post-conviction innocence track proposed in this Article provides a means of 
addressing the shift away from the “primacy of innocence” in federal habeas jurisprudence since 
the passage of AEDPA. In some respects, this proposal revives the Hoffmann and Stuntz proposal 
discussed in Part IV above. Although their proposal was raised over twenty years ago, Hoffmann 
and Stuntz’ argument in favor of reform applies with even greater force today. Indeed, the events 
of the last two decades since their proposal—the passage of AEDPA in 1996 and the Innocence 
Movement’s impact on the criminal justice system in the years since—support the need for more 
comprehensive and systemic federal habeas reform. 
A federal post-conviction innocence track would operate to restore federal habeas corpus 
to its historic purpose, by focusing judicial resources on petitioners raising viable claims of actual 
innocence.
259
 The establishment of an innocence track in this context would restore the “primacy 
of innocence” in federal habeas review,
260
 and would strike a more measured balance between the 
completing interests of finality and fairness than the one achieved by the enactment of AEDPA.
261
 
Finally, in contrast to the pretrial innocence track proposals, discussed in Part III above, 
262
 the 
federal post-conviction innocence track proposed in this Article would not require waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights. 
                                                                
256  Id. 
257  Id. 
258  Id. 
259  See Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 85 (discussing the notion of “the primacy of innocence” in 
federal habeas corpus jurisprudence). 
260  Id. 
261  See Lott, supra note 71, at 456-57 (noting that critics characterize justice and fairness as “secondary 
considerations” under the AEDPA). 
262  See supra notes 193-196 and accompanying text. 
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A.  Threshold Showing of Innocence 
Participation in the federal post-conviction innocence track would involve a two-part 
process.  First, a petitioner would be required satisfy a threshold showing of innocence by a 
preponderance of evidence in order to obtain a hearing. Next, once a hearing is ordered, a 
petitioner would be required to satisfy a more onerous standard to obtain post-conviction relief. 
This Article proposes that the “preponderance of the evidence” standard historically imposed by 
common law,
263
 prior to the passage of AEDPA, is the appropriate threshold standard for 
establishing factual innocence. Thus, in order to obtain a hearing, a petitioner seeking to opt into 
the federal post-conviction innocence track would be required to show that new evidence supports 
a finding that the petitioner was “probably factually innocent of the crime.” As Hoffmann and 
Stuntz proposed in 1993,
264
 the innocence track proposed here contemplates either a “naked” 
claim of innocence, or an innocence claim raised in conjunction with an allegation of a related 
constitutional violation, such as ineffective assistance of counsel or a Brady claim. 
While this new proposed standard represents a departure from the “clear and convincing” 
standard imposed under AEDPA, the lower standard is warranted as a threshold showing in light 
of the exoneration data from the Innocence Movement over the last twenty-five years. However, 
under this proposal, once a hearing is ordered based on a showing of innocence by a 
preponderance of evidence, the petitioner would then be required to establish innocence by the 
more onerous “clear and convincing evidence” standard at the hearing. The two-part process of 
review under the proposed federal post-conviction innocence track would help prevent 
foreclosure of innocence claims on the merits, while at the same time limiting relief to the rare 
occurrence where innocence is definitively established. 
Had Congress been aware of the depth of the wrongful conviction crisis known today, it 
arguably would have imposed a less onerous threshold standard for establishing innocence. Prior 
to the enactment of AEDPA, the Supreme Court established a standard for raising claims of 
innocence based on newly discovered evidence in Schlup v. Delo.
265
 This standard is consistent 
with the Schlup standard, where the Court noted that “habeas corpus, at its core, is an equitable 
remedy.”
266
 The Schlup court found that allowing federal habeas relief upon a petitioner’s 
showing that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is 
innocent” is consistent with the purpose of federal habeas review of state court convictions.
267
 
Since its enactment, AEDPA has imposed a more onerous standard for raising claims of 
innocence in the post-conviction context. Specifically, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a 
petitioner’s claim for relief must be based on new evidence supporting the prisoner’s innocence 
by “clear and convincing evidence.”
268
 Restoring the Schlup “preponderance of evidence” 
standard as the threshold showing for a claim of innocence helps to achieve the desired balance 
between the competing interests of finality and fairness. This standard also recognizes that 
                                                                
263  Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (recognizing actual innocence as a gateway through which a 
petitioner may pass a procedural bar and requiring a “more likely than not” standard to support a claim of innocence). 
264  See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text. 
265  See supra note 263. 
266  Id. at 320. 
267  Id. at 328. 
268  Supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
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wrongful convictions of the innocent occur at more significant rates than was known prior to the 
Innocence Movement. 
While this proposed standard is also lower than the one contemplated by Hoffmann and 
Stuntz in their 1993 proposal, a lesser burden in establishing innocence is warranted in light of the 
Innocence Movement and its impact on the criminal justice system. The Hoffmann and Stuntz 
proposal was raised at a time when wrongful convictions of the innocent were believed to be 
virtually non-existent. In that context, requiring such a high standard seemed appropriate, as the 
contemplated remedy was only rarely imposed. Today, wrongful convictions of the innocent are 
recognized are far more commonplace than what was believed in the early 1990s; thus, a less 
onerous standard is warranted. 
Even so, the preponderance standard is a difficult one for petitioners to meet, as it would 
require prisoners to preliminarily demonstrate to the court that new evidence more likely than not 
supports a finding of innocence. This standard is sufficiently onerous to prevent abuse by guilty 
prisoners seeking to unjustly benefit from the innocence track. For example, a prisoner claiming 
that a single witness had recanted his or her testimony would be insufficient to meet this standard 
in most cases. As would a claim where the credibility of a prosecution witness had been 
challenged by new evidence. The preponderance standard would require the reviewing court to 
evaluate the new evidence in light of the strength of the evidence relied upon to convict the 
defendant at trial. 
Further, the imposition of the more onerous “clear and convincing” standard at the 
second phase of the process would help address concerns about unduly expanding post-conviction 
relief. Thus, federal review of a conviction would only be warranted where, as a whole, the 
weight of the new evidence of innocence outweighs the evidence presented in support of the 
underlying conviction. And post-conviction relief following a hearing would be granted even 
more rarely, only in cases where the evidence of innocence is definitive. 
B. Exemption to Procedural Bars 
The federal post-conviction innocence track proposed in this Article also contemplates a 
blanket exemption to procedural bars. Exempting prisoners from AEDPA’s procedural bars under 
this model is consistent with the historic purpose of federal habeas corpus and the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence.
269
 Further, this approach is consistent with Hoffmann and Stuntz’s 
innocence track proposal from 1993
270
—particularly in light of the subsequent passage of 
AEDPA, and the considerable additional procedural barriers it imposed on federal habeas 
petitioners.
271
 While Hoffmann and Stuntz envisioned a comparable waiver of procedural bars, 
their proposal was raised in the pre-AEDPA era, when few such barriers were in place in the 
federal realm. Indeed, the Hoffmann and Stuntz proposal contemplated that prisoners raising 
viable claims of factual innocence would not be subject to having their claims barred by state 
procedural requirements or failure to fully exhaust their claims in state court.
272
 
                                                                
269  Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (recognizing actual innocence as a gateway through which a 
petitioner may pass a procedural bar and requiring a “more likely than not” standard to support a claim of innocence). 
270  See supra notes 217-35 and accompanying text. 
271  See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text. 
272  Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 5 at 96 (asserting that, under the authors’ proposed innocence track, a 
prisoner who successfully raises a threshold claim of innocence would be entitled to review “without regard to any 
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1. One-Year Limitations Period 
The federal post-conviction innocence track would exempt participants from AEDPA’s 
one-year limitations period. Since the passage of AEDPA, legal scholars have advocated for an 
actual innocence exception to the one-year limitations period imposed under § 2244(d)(1).
273
 This 
approach recognizes the inherent challenges of post-conviction litigation, particularly where 
actual innocence is raised. For example, federal habeas petitioners are incarcerated, and are 
overwhelmingly acting in a pro se status, and there is a tendency for evidence of innocence to 
emerge in an ad hoc fashion, bit by bit over time.
274
 
Thus, a prisoner could petition for federal habeas corpus review under the innocence 
track whenever the new evidence of innocence presented itself, regardless of whether it occurred 
within AEDPA’s one-year restriction. This approach would allow review of petitions on the 
merits, based on actual innocence. 
2. Prohibition on Second and Successive Petitions 
Under the federal post-conviction innocence track model, petitioners who satisfy the 
gateway actual innocence requirement would also be exempt from the prohibition against second 
and successive petitions imposed under AEDPA. Specifically, the “piecemeal problem” discussed 
in Part VB1 above, supports an exemption from this procedural bar.
275
 Prisoners acting in a pro se 
status lack the training and experience of assigned counsel and face the uphill battle of piecing 
together proof of innocence while incarcerated.
276
 Given these realities, each attempt by a prisoner 
to access new information—whether to re-interview witnesses, locate physical evidence for 
biological testing, or gain access to documents—is likely to be delayed, if not foreclosed.
277
 
To further complicate matters, once a prisoner finally succeeds in gaining access to 
potentially exonerating new evidence, AEDPA’s strict limitations period requires immediate 
filing. The combination of these influences results in the need to file successive petitions in order 
to get all the relevant information before the reviewing court.
278
 Again, exempting petitioners 
from this procedural bar under the innocence track would result in greater numbers of viable 
innocence claims being heard on the merits. 
                                                                
possible procedural deficiencies”). 
273  See, e.g., Sussman, note 42, at 363 (criticizing AEDPA’s one-year limitations period as unreasonable, 
particularly vis a vis petitions raising claims of actual innocence); see also Zheng, supra note 32, at 2103-07 (discussing 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations provision as a radical departure from historical federal habeas jurisprudence and noting its 
impact on petitioners raising claims of actual innocence). 
274  See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text. 
275  Id. 
276  Id.  
277  See Hartung, supra note 15, at 89-90 (identifying the “piecemeal problem” as a reality in federal habeas 
litigation, and noting that “it is no surprise that when a pro se prisoner seeks federal habeas corpus review, the process is 
likely to occur via multiple successive petitions, each raising a new ground for relief”). 
278  See id. at 90 (noting that filing multiple federal habeas petitions “is not a tactic, or an abuse of the 
system, but rather a necessity for a person acting alone to pursue a legal remedy while incarcerated”). 
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C. Application of De Novo Review 
Once the threshold is met, demonstrating that new evidence supports the petitioner’s 
probable factual innocence, a petitioner seeking to opt into the federal post-conviction innocence 
track would be entitled to de novo review of the underlying state conviction. Again, this approach 
strikes a balance between the recalibrated policy interests of finality and fairness underlying the 
AEDPA debate in the mid-1990’s. Specifically, allowing de novo review in this limited context 
would provide for a more comprehensive (and admittedly more expensive) scrutiny in cases 
where a legitimate issue of actual innocence has been raised. 
And while de novo review is undoubtedly costly, and would impose significant demands 
on limited judicial resources, it is difficult to argue that these financial concerns warrant keeping 
innocent prisoners behind bars. Aside from the moral imperative supporting this approach, there 
is a practical argument in favor of addressing wrongful convictions systemically and efficiently. 
Finding a procedure that effectively brings wrongful convictions of the innocent to light will 
prevent the imposition of astronomical civil settlements for wrongful conviction under state 
compensation statutes. 
The reality of post-conviction litigation is that, without counsel, incarcerated federal 
habeas petitioners have the deck stacked against them and are unlikely to secure relief.
279
 Over 
twenty years ago, when Hoffmann and Stuntz proposed a federal habeas track in the pre-AEDPA 
era, they argued that their approach would “greatly simplify habeas doctrine” and ultimately 
would “protect many values, of which innocence is the most important.”
280
 The federal post-
conviction innocence track proposed in this Article would promote these values in a comparable 
way, and at a time when they are under attack. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The primacy of innocence in federal habeas jurisprudence is a concept that significantly 
pre-dates AEDPA. Yet the passage of AEDPA has operated to eviscerate federal habeas review of 
state court convictions for the innocent and guilty alike. This legislation was debated and enacted 
before the Innocence Movement began in earnest, and has not been meaningfully re-examined 
since. Now that the twenty-sixth anniversary of the first DNA exoneration is upon us, the time has 
come to revisit federal habeas procedures. With the benefit of the exoneration data stemming 
from the Innocence Movement, and a better understanding of the depths of the wrongful 
conviction crisis in our criminal justice system, the competing interests animating the original 
AEDPA debate must be recalibrated. Indeed, the interests of accuracy and substantive justice 
weigh more heavily today against the competing interest of finality of criminal judgments. The 
federal post-conviction innocence track proposed in this Article would achieve a more measured 
balance of these interests and would help bring about the systemic change historically absent from 
the array of previous Innocence Movement reforms. 
 
                                                                
279  Hoffman & King, Opinion, supra note 115 (noting that “only a tiny fraction” of the 17,000 habeas 
petitioners obtain any form of relief). 
280  Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 99. 
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